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U.S. Navy ships receive their annual operating funds from their
type commander in the form of an OPTAR (Operating Target). The
ship's OPTAR can be viewed as the funding necessary to execute its
annual budget. At present the type commander's budget office essen-
tially divides each ship's annual OPTAR authorization into fourths and
allocates to the unit one-fourth of its total annual amount authorized
for each quarter of the fiscal year. No attempt is made to allocate the
OPTAR on the basis of when the funds are likely to be most needed.
This thesis studies OPTAR spending patterns for two classes of
Navy ships in the Pacific Fleet and attempts to draw conclusions as to
the impact of operational scheduling and other factors on the OPTAR
obligation rates for these ships. Parametric and non-parametric
statistical methods were used to study potential relationships between
OPTAR spending and operational employment. Based on the results of
this analysis, it was found that there is no significant relationship
between the operational employment of a ship and its OPTAR spend-
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With increased Congressional attention being focused each year on
the Defense budget due to deficits and the growing national debt, it
has become imperative that military managers ensure each DOD dollar
be spent as efficiently and effectively as possible. Within the
Department of the Navy, this has meant streamlining operations and
learning to "do more with less."
Annual operating costs for U.S. Navy ships are high. In order to
ensure that the Operation and Maintenance funding appropriated by
Congress for these ships is spent in the most efficient manner, while
at the same time maintaining maximum readiness and meeting all
operational commitments, it is important that these funds be properly
budgeted and obligated. The scarcity of such funds demands that
managers strive to achieve the most return for the dollar. Dollars
need to be allocated where they are most needed, which in turn
means that those responsible for allocating the dollars need to know
who needs the dollars most and when they are needed.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the OPTAR spending rates
for two classes of surface ships assigned to the U.S. Pacific fleet, and
attempt to draw conclusions as to the impact that operational
scheduling and other factors have on the OPTAR obligation rates for
the two classes of ships. If spending patterns can be identified, and
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the causes of these patterns can be shown to be related to operational
scheduling or other predictable factors, then budget personnel and
other fiscal planners, given advance information about ship's sched-
ules, might be better able to effectively allocate the scarce funding
available.
The primary research question for this thesis is as follows:
• Are there readily identifiable spending patterns (patterns in the
OPTAR obligation rates) for either of the two classes of ships
examined?
The subsidiary research questions which will be examined and
discussed are as follows:
• If patterns are evident in the spending rates, are these patterns
dependent on the ship's operational schedule?
• If patterns are evident in the spending rates, are these patterns
dependent on the current policy of "spending the allocated
OPTAR before the funding expires in order to avoid the loss of
funding in future periods?"
B. DISCUSSION
U.S. Navy ships receive annual operating funds from their respec-
tive type commander in the form of an OPTAR (Operating Target).
The ship's OPTAR can be viewed as the funding necessary to execute
its annual "budget." At present, the type commander's budget office
The term "type commander" refers to the administrative
superior in a ship's chain of command who is responsible for allocating
the ship's OPTAR. The type commander is responsible to the fleet
commander for the financial management of all ships, squadrons, and
units under his command. The type commander for the Pacific fleet
surface ships examined in this thesis is Commander Naval Surface
Forces Pacific, commonly abbreviated COMNAVSURFPAC.
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divides each ship's annual OPTAR authorization into fourths, and at the
beginning of each quarter of the fiscal year, allocates to each ship one-
fourth of its total annual amount authorized. No attempt is made to
allocate the OPTAR funds on the basis of when the funds are likely to
be most needed. Problems in budgeting can arise when ships do not
obligate their funds at this constant rate from quarter to quarter. As
shown in Appendix C, there are wide fluctuations in the rate at which
individual ships obligate their OPTAR. Even within the same ship
class, the obligation rates can vary dramatically from ship to ship.
This thesis will attempt to determine whether any discernable
patterns in OPTAR obligation exist. Since a ship's operational
employment normally tends to drive the ship's activities, particular
emphasis will be placed on studying the relationship, if any, between
the ship's schedule and its obligation rate.
C. SCOPE
Data collection for the thesis involved a random sample of Pacific
fleet units from two different classes of ships— the KNOX (FF-1052)
class frigate and the BELKNAP (CG-26) class cruiser. (Further infor-
mation concerning sample selection will be discussed in Chapter III).
Once the sample ships were selected, data concerning the ships'
scheduling were collected, along with all available monthly obligation
reports and other OPTAR, Budget, and obligation type reports. Two
fiscal years of cost and schedule data were used in the analysis. This
data was analyzed in an attempt to identify patterns and relationships
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in OPTAR spending in order to study the thesis questions previously
stated.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
One overriding assumption made in the analysis of the data is that
those personnel aboard the individual ship who are responsible for
managing the allocated OPTAR resources (Commanding Officer,
Supply Officer, Department Heads), do so in a rational manner,
meaning that each ship conscientiously attempts to husband available
financial resources, as opposed to spending in a haphazard manner
and then "asking for more." While it might be argued that some ships
are less than fiscally conservative when it comes to OPTAR manage-
ment, this assumption is necessary in order to make certain judg-
ments concerning spending patterns. Further discussions of this
assumption, and its impact on the interpretation of the results of the
data analysis are contained in later chapters.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
As discussed earlier, this thesis focuses on analyzing cost and
schedule data for selected ships and attempts to draw conclusions
about spending patterns and their causes. Prior to the actual analysis
of data, some brief background information will be provided in Chapter
II. including a comparison of the type commander's budgeting prob-
lem with the problem of cash management in private industry. Addi-
tionally, a review of the procedures for OPTAR budgeting at
COMNAVSURFPAC will be provided.
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Chapter III will discuss data collection procedures and the
methodology used in the analysis, as well as present highlights of the
data collected, including ship schedules and OPTAR obligation
information.
Chapter IV contains an analysis of the data collected, and an initial
interpretation of the analysis.
The final Chapter provides a brief summary of the findings with
respect to the analysis of OPTAR obligation rates and their depen-
dency on ships schedules and other factors.
Appendix A provides detailed information with respect to the
ships studied in this thesis and their operating schedules for fiscal
years 1985 and 1986. Appendix B provides detailed information with
respect to these same ships' monthly OPTAR obligation rates as
reported in monthly BOR's (Budget OPTAR Reports) from the ships.
Appendix C contains OPTAR obligation graphs for each ship included
in the thesis, for both fiscal years studied.
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II. OVERVIEW OF CASH MANAGEMENT
A. CASH MANAGEMENT IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
The need for efficient budgeting in the Navy can be more easily-
understood if the concept of "cash management" is first examined
from a civilian business perspective. The problem facing a Navy type
commander in the area of OPTAR allocation most closely resembles
the problem of cash management in the civilian sector. The following
sections briefly describe the concept of cash management.
1. Cash Management Concepts
Cash has been described as the "oil that lubricates the wheels
of business." (Brigham, 1985) Just as a machine fails to work effi-
ciently without an adequate oil supply, and can be in danger of self-
destruction, so too is a business that experiences inadequate cash flow.
On the other hand, too much oil in a machine often serves no purpose.
A company that carries an excessive cash balance is also being waste-
ful. By itself, cash is a non-earning asset. A firm that holds cash
beyond its minimum requirements is lowering its potential earnings.
In order to maximize earnings potential, the goal of any firm should be
to minimize the amount of cash held without adversely affecting busi-
ness activities (Brigham, 1985).
The discipline of cash management has evolved as one of the
more critical areas of financial management within a company.
Although the study of cash management escaped treatment in financial
15
management and operations research literature for many years, the
dramatic rise in interest rates over the past two decades has focused a
renewed interest in properly managing cash assets.
Cash management is generally defined in financial literature
as that area of financial management that encompasses those tech-
niques used to collect and report financial data relevant to the man-
agement of the cash assets of a business (National Association of
Accountants, 1961). These cash assets are generally defined as being
composed of cash, marketable securities and other highly liquid or
"near cash" assets.
The study of cash management is not completely new. As
mentioned previously, the rise in interest rates over the years has
increased managerial attention to this area, but the rise in interest
rates alone is not the sole reason for the renewed emphasis by
managers. Since World War II, the expansion of corporations into
multi-divisional "profit center" structures has greatly increased the
problems of funding corporate operations (Hill, 1970). Additionally,
the Post-war Employment Act of 1946 had a major impact on the
availability and cost of money. The twin objectives of reduced
unemployment and a higher standard of living with minimal inflation
produced a very strong consumer and social demand for goods and
services that business and government had a hard time satisfying (Hill,
1970). This resulted in a dramatic rise in interest rates (from about
1% in 1945 to as high as 18% in the early 1980s). Finally,
improvements in communications and transportation have facilitated
16
innovations for faster movement and clearing of funds within the
country's banking system (Hill, 1970).
2. Cash Management Objectives
There are several objectives associated with cash manage-
ment that are often cited in financial literature. Cash is a "non-
earning" asset and efficient management of a firm's cash assets
involves all steps taken to achieve the following primary objectives of
cash management:
• ensuring sufficient cash is available to the firm when it is needed
• accelerating net cash flows (by "speeding up" cash inflows and
"slowing down" cash outflows)
• improving cash utilization through careful investment of excess or
otherwise idle cash
"Cash flow" in a financial sense is often defined as the firm's
net income after adding back expense items which do not use funds in
the current period, such as depreciation. It may also involve the
deduction of revenue items which do not currently provide funds,
o
such as amortization of deferred income (Mason, 1961). The con-
cept of net cash flow as the amount of resources or funds made avail-
able after meeting current requirements of revenue earning operations
is a valid and useful tool in the field of cash management. Cash flow
analysis is useful in:
This is a somewhat simplified definition of cash flow.
Investment and financing activities of a firm also contribute to a firm's
net cash flow. More detailed coverage of the topic of measuring cash
flows can be found in most accounting or financial management texts.
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• determining debt retirement requirements of the firm.
• maintaining regular dividends to stockholders.
• financing replacement and expansion costs of the firm.
The overall objective of cash management is to provide for
the adequate availability and safekeeping of corporate funds under
varied economic conditions in order to help achieve desired corporate
objectives. (Hill, 1970). In order to meet this objective, financial
managers use various tools to measure and monitor the flow of cash
within the firm. The development and use of these tools is what the
study of cash management is all about.
3. Why Cash Management is Important
There are two major sources of capital employed in the oper-
ation of a business. First, there is the "cash fund," which is defined as
capital in the form of cash or equivalent assets. Second, there is the
"operating fund," which is defined as capital in the form of all other
assets from which the company expects to derive its earnings, such as
inventories, plant and equipment (National Association of Accountants,
1961). Since the "cash fund" is the most liquid and the least "fixed"
of the two sources of capital, and since cash is a non-earning asset,
increased efficiency in the management of cash accounts can result in
greatly improved earnings for the firm, brought about by reduced
operating costs (The Conference Board, Inc., 1961).
There are numerous other reasons cited in literature as to
why efficient cash management is important to a firm. The three
primary reasons cited are as follows:
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• to ensure sufficient cash is available at the time and place needed
in order to meet obligations. Failure to do so can impair the
firm's credit standing, which in turn can result in the firm being
forced to obtain financing on unfavorable terms, and can even
result in the firm's bankruptcy (National Association of Accoun-
tants, pp. 2-3.).
• to maintain a rate of cash flow which enables the company to keep
abreast of technological advances and growth within its industry.
• to provide management personnel the information needed to
support decision making concerning the employment of the
firm's assets. This type of information is not normally developed
in the firm's accounting process of forecasting and measuring
periodic income. This is due to the accrual accounting proce-
dures used, wherein receipts and disbursements of cash do not
necessarily take place in the same periods in which revenues and
costs are recognized.
4. Cash Management Techniques
In order to achieve the objectives associated with efficient
cash management, most companies have focused their attention on
the following three areas: improved cash forecasts (cash budgeting),
tightened control over sources and uses of funds, and sound invest-
ment of surplus cash resources (The Conference Board, Inc., 1961).
a Improved Cash Forecasts
Most successful corporations have, over a period of time,
developed their own plans for determining what funds will be needed
to run their companies. In financial management literature, such
plans are known as forecasts (Hill, 1970). In some literature, these
forecasts are called cash budgets. Forecasts serve a variety of purposes
in the management of cash within a company. Specifically, the cash
forecasts can be useful in the following areas (National Association of
Accountants, 1961):
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• determining funds available for future growth and expansion.
• identifying ways of improving rate of return on assets.
• identifying funds available for temporary investment.
• determining working capital requirements.
• planning for payments to both shareholders and creditors.
There are two basic types of cash forecasts used in most
corporations, short-term forecasts and long-term forecasts (Hill,
1970).
( 1 ) Short-Term Forecasts . Short-term cash fore-
casts (cash budgets) are used primarily to determine short-term
financing needs, and usually cover a period of not more than one year
(The Conference Board, Inc., 1961). These forecasts are also used in
determining cash operating requirements, short-term financing
needs, cash availability for temporary investments, and high and low
points in the corporate cash cycle (Hill, 1970). Although the detailed
procedures for developing short-term cash budgets are beyond the
scope of this thesis, financial literature cites two primary methods for
developing these forecasts. The first is the Cash Receipts and
Disbursement Method, and the second is the Adjusted Net Income
method.
Under the Cash Receipts and Disbursements
method, the financial manager attempts to project all cash items to be
received or disbursed, including operational and non-operational
items, items that arise from the projected purchase or sale of assets,
and items that indicate increases or decreases in either creditor or
20
equity investment in the corporation (Hill, 1970). This form of cash
forecast tends to be most useful in managing the day-to-day control of
cash.
The Adjusted Net Income method projects changes
in the balance sheet, particularly in the working capital items.
Estimated profit is adjusted for changes that affect cash such as
receivables and inventory, and for non-operating changes such as
capital expenditures. Further adjustments are made for non-cash
items such as depreciation expenses to arrive at the final cash forecast
figures. This method tends to be more accurate than the Cash
Receipts and Disbursements method when estimating the cash posi-
tion for forecasts of a quarter or longer (Hill, 1970).
(2) Long-Term Forecasts . Long-term or long-
range forecasts are not as detailed as the short-term forecasts, and
generally cover a period of time of anywhere from three to ten years
(The Conference Board, Inc., 1961). They are used to forecast the
effect of the company's long-range plans on the company's future
balance sheets (The Conference Board, Inc., 1961). They tend to be
very general in nature, and attempt to show only the more significant
changes on the balance sheet caused by major acquisitions, the
introduction of new products, and the long-term growth of the
corporation (Hill, 1970).
b. Control Over Sources and Uses of Funds
Numerous ways of improving control over sources and
uses of funds have been developed. These improved control
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techniques all contribute to a more efficient use of cash within the
corporation. The following practices are used by the more efficient
corporations in managing and conserving cash flows:
• speeding up collections
- the use of lock boxes
- area concentration banking
• tightening control over inventories and inventory policies
• scheduling of payables
c. Investing Surplus Cash
Most firms, after developing a cash management plan
that minimizes the amount of cash that must be kept on hand, still
experience seasonal peaks and valleys in demand for cash. At times
these firms find that they have an excess of cash on hand. Sound
investment of excess cash has become a standard practice in most
larger firms. Normally this excess cash is invested in short term
instruments— usually those that mature in less than one year (The
Conference Board, Inc., 1961). The actual type of instrument used
will normally depend on the length of time the securities are expected
to be held, which in turn depends on the seasonal peaks and valleys in
the firm's demand for cash. The financial manager will select those
instruments whose liquidity and maturity patterns best suit the
company's needs. The following are examples of the types of
instruments often used by companies for investing excess cash
(Brigham, 1986):
• U.S. Treasury Bills
22
Commercial paper
Negotiable certificates of deposit
Money market mutual funds
Floating rate preferred stock mutual funds





B. CASH MANAGEMENT AND OPTAR ALLOCATION
Having looked at the concept of cash management in the civilian
sector, parallels can be drawn between the problems faced by civilian
managers in properly budgeting for cash outlays, and the problems
faced by Navy budgeting personnel in allocating OPTAR funds to sub-
ordinate commands. Before looking at the similarities, a brief
overview of OPTAR funds, including the general flow of these funds, is
in order.
1. The Flow of Funding Within the Department of the Navy
This thesis focuses on the allocation of OPTAR funds to ships
of the operating forces. The OPTAR monies allocated to individual
ships originate from within the O&M.N (Operation and Maintenance.
Navy) accounts of the Annual Budget of the United States, and a brief
explanation of the flow of these funds follows. The explanation is
somewhat simplified for greater ease in understanding the general
flow.
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Following appropriation of funding by Congress and appor-
tionment of these funds to the Secretary of Defense by the President's
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), all Navy O&M.N funds flow-
first through the Office of the Comptroller of the Navy (Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management), and are then
allocated to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Comptroller. The
CNO's comptroller (OP-92) administers and reallocates the funds to
the next levels of responsibility, known as "major claimants."
The "major claimants" are the higher echelon commanders
within the Navy who are responsible for managing their forces within
the prescribed limits of the assigned allocation. The allocation
assigned represents a legally binding spending limitation that the
major claimant must ensure is not exceeded. The Navy's fleet
commanders, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), are the major
claimants for for all operating forces under their operational
command. The major claimant for Pacific fleet surface ships is
CINCPACFLT.
The next step in the flow of funds is the issuance of an
"expense limitation" by the major claimant to the subordinate type
commanders (Department of the Navy, 1974). For the ships studied
in this thesis, the type commander is Commander Naval Surface
Forces Pacific. Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific
(COMNAVSURFPAC) is responsible to CINCPACFLT for the financial
management of all forces under his command.
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From the expense limitation provided by the fleet comman-
der, COMNAVSURFPAC assigns each ship under his administrative
command an "Operating Target" (OPTAR). An OPTAR is an estimate
of the amount of money which will be required by the ship to perform
the tasks and functions assigned during the fiscal year (Department of
the Navy, 1974). The ships are treated as cost centers and their
OPTAR expenditures are monitored very closely by the type
commander. Since the assigned OPTAR is an administrative spending
limit and is not legally binding , by monitoring the expenditure of
OPTAR by units under his command, COMNAVSURFPAC is able to
redistribute available funds throughout the fiscal year in order to
ensure that they are spent where they are most needed. Thus the
term Operating Target is quite descriptive— the money figures
3provided to the individual ships are indeed only "target" amounts.
At the type commander level, the fiscal and budget personnel
are careful to ensure that the total amount of the expense limitation
assigned by the major claimant for the operation and maintenance of
assigned units is not exceeded. However, within this aggregate figure,
they have the flexibility to use funds where they are most needed, and
3Although a ship's OPTAR is not a legally binding limit on
spending, most ships attempt to remain within the limits of the
OPTAR figures imposed by the type commander. Failure to remain
within these limits, or excessive requests by the ship for OPTAR
augments or loans, are considered by superiors in the chain of
command to be indicative of inefficient management of financial
resources at the shipboard level.
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are able to redistribute excess funds as necessary throughout the fiscal
year to units having legitimate unfunded requirements.
2. OPTAR Allocation bv COMNAVSURFPAC
The procedures used by COMNAVSURFPAC in allocating
OPTAR amounts to assigned units is relatively straightforward. Using
historical data on operating costs for the various classes of surface
ships assigned, each ship is assigned an annual operating cost esti-
mate. These estimated operating costs are generally the same for all
units within a given ship class. The amounts assigned to ships within
a class may vary somewhat when an individual unit has configuration
differences (different weapons systems or electronics suites), or when
other factors tend to differentiate the unit (overseas homeporting,
need for habitability upgrade, etc). By and large, these differences in
estimated annual operating costs are minor.
The estimated annual operating cost for the assigned ships
becomes the basis for each ship's annual OPTAR amount. This annual
OPTAR figure is divided into fourths and allocated to the ships on a
quarterly basis. In general, there are no attempts made to allocate the
annual OPTAR on the basis of anything other than a straight one-fourth
per quarter basis.
Historical data has shown that the ships do not necessarily
obligate their assigned OPTAR at such an even rate. The graphs con-
tained in Appendix C show the uneven rate at which ships obligate
their OPTAR funds. In any given quarter a ship may also experience
funding needs that exceed their quarterly allocation. These situations
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are dealt with on a case basis by COMNAVSURFPAC budget personnel
in one of two ways. First, a ship requiring excess funds may request an
advance, or a redistribution of funds from next quarter's OPTAR
allocation to this quarter. This is basically a "loan," and reduces the
amount of OPTAR that the ship will receive in follow-on quarters
without impacting on the overall annual OPTAR amount. Second,
COMNAVSURFPAC has the option of granting the ship an OPTAR
augment. An OPTAR augment is an increase in overall OPTAR alloca-
tion with no effect on succeeding quarter's OPTAR. The net effect is
an increase in both the OPTAR allocation for the quarter, and an
increase in the ship's annual OPTAR allocation. COMNAVSURFPAC
normally uses OPTAR advances to help ships meet funding shortfalls
when they occur. OPTAR augments are generally reserved for cases
involving unidentified or short-fused requirements that the ships
would have been unable to plan and budget for. Funding augments to a
ship's OPTAR are made from an Augment Reserve fund maintained by
COMNAVSURFPAC for just such contingencies.
At the end of the fiscal year, COMNAVSURFPAC redistributes
excess funds as necessary and as available, in order to ensure that
O&M.N funds granted by CINCPACFLT are used efficiently and effec-
tively where they are most needed. Normally, any excess funds are
used to augment ship's OPTARs in order to take care of high priority
unfunded requirements still pending at the end of the fiscal year. If
there are insufficient unfunded requirements, then excess funds
remaining toward the end of the fiscal year may be returned by
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COMNAVSURFPAC to CINCPACFLT for reprogramming or redistribu-
tion to other type commanders.
3. The Cash Management Problem Revisited
COMNAVSURFPAC manages the OPTAR accounts for over 160
assigned surface ships. In fiscal year 1986 the COMNAVSURFPAC
Spending Plan Summary budgeted over $200 million dollars for ship
operations and maintenance. Allocating and monitoring the expendi-
ture of these funds is the responsibility of the COMNAVSURFPAC
Force Comptroller, assisted by the Fiscal Officer and his budget staff.
The problems facing these personnel are not unlike those problems
facing civilian executives who must deal with cash management in
large corporations. Certain aspects of managing these accounts are
similar to the cash management problems encountered in a civilian
firm.
The expense limitation provided to COMNAVSURFPAC by
CINCPACFLT for the purpose of operating and maintaining the
assigned ships can be viewed as the "cash" asset account. This figure
represents how much money is to be spent by all of the ships assigned
to COMNAVSURFPAC over the entire fiscal year. How this money is
allocated and budgeted for expenditure by the assigned ships is a
problem faced by the COMNAVSURFPAC staff.
4It should be pointed out that no cash is actually involved, rather
funds are set aside into various "accounts." When funds are allocated
to the type commander (COMNAVSURFPAC) by CINCPACFLT, or by
COMNAVSURFPAC to individual ships, it is merely these accounts that
change hands.
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The primary objectives of cash management within a civilian
firm are to ensure cash availability when and where needed throughout
the fiscal year and to provide for the most efficient use of the firm's
cash assets. These objectives apply equally as well to the management
of the OPTAR accounts for the ships assigned to COMNAVSURFPAC.
Proper allocation and budgeting of available OPTAR funds ensures the
most efficient use of these assets, and also ensures that funding is
available to ships when and where it is most needed.
Proper cash management procedures within civilian firms
usually include provisions for providing management personnel with
critical feedback information needed to support decision-making with
respect to the firm's cash assets. At COMNAVSURFPAC this is
accomplished through close monitoring of each ship's monthly Budget
OPTAR Report (BOR). This report is discussed further in the next
chapter, and is mentioned here only to point out that this report
allows COMNAVSURFPAC budget personnel to monitor the OPTAR
obligation rates for all the ships of the force in order to ensure that
the funds are being used correctly and effectively.
Another cash management technique common to civilian
firms is the strict control over the sources and uses of cash funds.
While COMNAVSURFPAC has little control over the "source" of the
OPTAR funds (the expense limitation is always received from
CINCPACFLT in the form of annual and quarterly advance planning
figures), the Force Comptroller is able to exercise some control over
the "uses" of the funds. This is accomplished by controlling who gets
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what funds initially, and how they are spent throughout the fiscal year.
Often funds are granted to a ship and are specifically designated to be
spent on certain high-interest programs (like galley improvements
and crew's berthing modifications). Additionally, such earmarked
funds are often granted to ships during the fiscal year in the form of
OPTAR augments. Ship's are also able to take advantage of what are
known as "automatic take-up" funds. Automatic take-up funds allow a
ship to automatically grant itself an OPTAR augment (without prior
notification of or approval by COMNAVSURFPAC) when excessive
amounts of money have been spent on pre-designated items such as
expendable bathythermographs (XBTs), or tug services (items of
operational necessity and high cost which are often difficult to budget
for).
One final area in which similarities (and differences) between
cash management and OPTAR management can be seen is in the area
of budgeting. Cash budgets are an absolute necessity to ensure the
most efficient use of a firm's cash assets. Businesses go to great pains
to attempt to develop both long-term and short-term cash budgets.
These budgets, particularly the short-term variety, are laid out in great
detail. Every attempt is made to ensure that most accurate data possi-
ble is used in the cash budget. Firms attempt to be very exact as to
when specific inflows and outflows of cash are going to occur.
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COMNAVSURFPAC also budgets for the outlay of the OPTAR
5funds. However, as mentioned earlier, no real attempt is make to
predict precisely when funds will be needed by any specific unit. An
annual estimate of operating costs is arrived at for each surface unit,
and then this figure is basically "divided by four" and allocated to the
unit on a quarterly basis. In looking at the spending data for various
classes of ships (as shown in Appendix C and discussed in chapters
three and four), it is apparent that ships do not obligate their OPTAR
at such a steady, even rate. Unfortunately, there are no algorithms at
present that allow budget personnel to accurately predict OPTAR obli-
gation rates or patterns.
The potential problems associated with present budget prac-
tices should be obvious. Situations might occur wherein some ships
have excess funds in a given quarter, while other ships are in dire
need of additional money due to different operational commitments
and other factors. This problem is discussed further in the next
section.
4. The Need for Efficient OPTAR Allocation
If it were possible to accurately and reliably predict OPTAR
obligation patterns for the ships assigned, numerous benefits might
accrue to various participants in the budget process. First of all. it is
almost certain that OPTAR money would be spent more efficiently.
5COMNAVSURFPAC budgets are considered short term, as they
are developed on a fiscal year basis only. Long-term budgets, similar
to those used in civilian firms, are not used.
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Consider the following hypothetical (and greatly simplified) example.
Assume ships A and B are both granted $1000 to spend this
week, without regard to their actual needs. Ship A is recently out of
overhaul, is in excellent material condition, and is not due to deploy
for another six months. Ship B, on the other hand, has been out of
overhaul for three years, is in fair material condition, and is deploying
next week for a six month tour of duty overseas. In preparation for its
upcoming operation, ship B immediately spends all its OPTAR funds
on critical repair parts, but is still in need of an additional $500 to
cover pre-deployment expenses. Ship A, which really only needs
$500 this week, knows that if it fails to spend the assigned OPTAR
funds, it may "lose" them (Ship As superior might take back the sur-
plus funds). Ship A therefore spends the money on items that may be
needed six months from now when it deploys. Now ship B is forced to
borrow against next week's OPTAR funds in order to pay for this
weeks needs. The bottom line is that one ship runs a "deficit" for this
week while the other "breaks even," even though it probably should
have shown a surplus that would have covered the first ship's deficit.
The inefficiency here is obvious. Given the two objectives of providing
funds when and where they are most needed and ensuring that all
funds are spent efficiently, it is easy to see that the method of
budgeting used in the example above could easily preclude achieve-
ment of these objectives.
Although difficult to quantify, and of little significance to
budget personnel at the COMNAVSURFPAC level, there is also the
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issue of interest payments that the United States government must
pay on all borrowed money. When appropriated money is spent ineffi-
ciently at lower levels of government (or the military), the inefficiency
contributes to increased government debt. Somewhere along the line
the government must borrow to pay the obligations made by the
hypothetical ships in the above example. Because Ship A spent its
surplus $500 on items it did not immediately require, the additional
$500 needed by ship B had to be borrowed. The borrowed funds
mean higher interest payments by the government, and increased
debt. With this in mind, it stands to reason that large sums of money
might be saved each year by the federal government if all levels and
branches of the government were able to more efficiently schedule
their "cash" outflows.
It is with these ideas in mind that the following thesis study
was undertaken. The remainder of this thesis focuses on attempting
to determine whether or not there are discernable patterns in ship's




A. SELECTION OF SHIP CLASSES TO BE EXAMINED
Two ship classes were selected for study in this thesis, the
BELKNAP class cruiser and the KNOX class frigate. The two classes
are representative of both ends of the maintenance cost spectrum.
The BELKNAP (CG-26) class cruisers represent the high end of
the cost spectrum. These large and relatively complex steam powered
warships are equipped with Standard surface-to-air missiles. Harpoon
anti-surface missiles, guns, and various anti-submarine weapons. They
are fitted with NTDS (Navy Tactical Data System) data link capabilities
that allow them to inte-grate well into an aircraft carrier battle group.
The primary mission of these ships is anti-air warfare (AAW), and they
were specifically designed to operate in an AAW role in support of air-
craft carrier battle groups.
The KNOX (FF-1052) class frigate represents the low end of the
cost spectrum. These relatively small, steam powered warships are
not as sophisticated as their cruiser counterparts. They are equipped
with a single five inch gun. Harpoon anti-ship missiles, the close-in
weapon system (CIWS), and various anti-submarine weapons and
sensors. They are not equipped with any sort of data link capability,
and thus do not integrate as well into a carrier battle group as do the
cruisers. The primary mission of the frigate is anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), and the ships were specifically designed as anti-submarine
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escorts for convoy operations. When operating in support of a carrier
battle group, frigates are normally employed in an ASW role, and are
assigned screening stations around the carrier for the purpose of
detecting enemy submarines.
B. SPECIFIC SHIPS CHOSEN FOR STUDY
Information was obtained from the COMNAVSURFPAC staff for
Pacific fleet units only. In the case of the BELKNAP class cruisers,
only five such ships are assigned to Pacific fleet, and all five were







ShiD Name Number Homeoort Code
USS Fox CG-33 San Diego 52708
USS Home CG-30 San Diego 52705
USS Jouett CG-29 San Diego 52704
USS W.H. Standley CG-32 San Diego 52707
USS Sterett CG-31 Subic Bay 52706
Source: Tab A to Appendix 15 to Annex C to COMNAVSURFPAC OPORD 201
Over 20 KNOX class frigates are assigned to Pacific fleet, so it was
necessary to select a small sample of these ships for study. Ten
frigates were chosen to be examined. The selection of these ships was
random with the exception of the four ships homeported in Yokosuka.
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Japan. These ships were specifically included in the sample in order
to collect data as to whether overseas homeporting has any effect on
ship operating and maintenance costs. Table II contains a listing of the












USS Cook FF-1083 San Diego 20054
USS Downes FF-1070 San Diego 54065
USS Fanning FF-1076 San Diego 54071
USS F. Hammond FF-1067 Yokosuka 54062
USS Kirk FF-1087 Yokosuka 20058
USS Knox FF-1052 Yokosuka 54047
USS Lockwood FF-1064 Yokosuka 54059
USS Stein FF-1065 San Diego 54060
USS Whipple FF-1062 Pearl Harbor 54057
Source: Tab A to Appendix 15 to Annex C to COMNAVSURFPAC OPORD 201
C. DATA COLLECTION AND CONVERSION
All data and other information collected for this study was
obtained from the COMNAVSURFPAC staff files. Two categories of
information were collected. First, schedule information was obtained
from the Current Operations Office (code N321). For each ship in the
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study, scheduling and employment data was gathered from the
Quarterly Employment Schedules for the fiscal years 1985 and 1986.
Next, OPTAR expenditure information was collected from the office of
the COMNAVSURFPAC Force Comptroller (code N72). The monthly
OPTAR obligation data was extracted from the monthly Budget OPTAR
Reports (BOR's) for each of the ships in the study for the fiscal years
1985 and 1986.
In order to put the scheduling and OPTAR information in a format
suitable for analysis, some conversion of the schedule data was
necessary.
The monthly BOR provides a great deal of information concerning
the obligation of each ship's OPTAR funds, including a breakdown of
these expenditures in ten-day increments. Because the spending
information was broken down into ten-day increments, it was neces-
sary to break down the ships' employment information into ten-day
periods as well. This was done by identifying the eight most
common ship employment categories, and then analyzing each ship's
schedule to determine which of these employment categories was
most appropriate for each ten-day period in the ship's schedule. The
Six of the eight employment categories used in this study are
similar to the categories used by the COMNAVSURFPAC budget staff
for their internal analysis of OPTAR expenditure data. They do not use
the two categories of "Training" (TRNG) and "Overhaul" (OVHL)
which are included above. Additionally, the COMNAVSURFPAC budget
staff has a separate category for the ship's Operational Propulsion Plant
Examination (OPPE) which for this study has been placed in the
category of "Inspections" (INSP).
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eight primary employment categories used in this analysis are
described in Table III.
TABLE III
EIGHT MAJOR EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES
Category Code Explanation/Remarks
Tender Availability or other maintenance periods
Scheduled deployment periods overseas
Routine inport periods in CONUS
Refresher and other Training periods
At-sea exercise periods (Fleetex, COMPTUEX, etc.)
All inspection periods (NTPI. OPPE. etc.)
At-sea periods for local ISE ops or transits









The converted ship scheduling information for each ship in the
study is contained in Appendix A to this thesis. This appendix lists
each ship's primary employment for each ten-day period for each
month in both fiscal years studied (the three ten-day periods are
referred to as "Period 1," "Period 2," and "Period 3"). In addition to
the primary employment information, the appendix lists the total
number of days each ship was underway during the month (under the
column headed "DAYS U/W").
The OPTAR obligation information for each ship in the study is
contained in Appendix B to this thesis. This appendix lists each ship's
OPTAR expenditures for each month of the two fiscal years studied.
Again, the information is broken down into three ten-day periods for
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each month. Monthly totals are contained in the final column, as are
total annual expenditure figures.
Having collected the necessary data and converted it into a format
useful for analysis, the next step was to conduct an analysis of the
information in an attempt to determine what, if any, patterns exist in
the OPTAR obligation rates for the ships examined, and what factors
influence OPTAR expenditure.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In analyzing the data contained in Appendices A and B, the first
step was to conduct a brief overview of the appropriate descriptive
statistics. The following sections describe the data for the two classes
of ships involved.
1. KNOX (FF-1052) Class Frigates
Four of the ten frigates involved in the study were home-
ported overseas (in Yokosuka, Japan). As mentioned previously, these
four ships were deliberately included in the sample in order to study
the effect of overseas (foreign) homeporting on ship operating costs.
The remaining six ships were homeported in U.S. ports, five in the
continental United States, with the remaining unit in Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii.
Over the two year period studied, each frigate obligated, on
the average, approximately $1,095 million dollars in OPTAR funds in
each fiscal year. Interestingly enough, the ships obligated more money
in fiscal year 1985 than they did in fiscal year 1986. The mean annual
OPTAR expenditure for fiscal year 1985 was $1,191 million dollars,
while the mean for fiscal year 1986 was only $997,000 per ship. The
data were widely spread about these means in both years, with a stan-
dard deviation in 1985 of over $68,000 and in 1986 exceeding
$108,000.
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The average monthly OPTAR obligation amount over the two
years studied was $92,103. Again, however, the data were very widely
dispersed about this mean, with a standard deviation of $50,380.
The monthly OPTAR obligations over the two-year period for
the frigates studied appear to be fairly normally distributed. The
histogram in Figure 1 shows the distribution for the monthly OPTAR
obligations for the Frigates included in the study.
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Figure 1
Histogram of Monthly OPTAR Obligations for Frigates
In analyzing the OPTAR obligation data, the monthly obliga-
tion amounts for each ship were also converted to percentages of total
annual OPTAR obligated. The distribution patterns were, as expected,
similar to the patterns observed for the aggregates (above). The aver-
age monthly percentage of total annual OPTAR expended was
approximately 8.4% (with a rather large standard deviation of 4.5%).
This mean of 8.4% is what would be expected for a normal distribution
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in which each ship is "on the average" obligating approximately one-
twelfth (8.33%) of its annual OPTAR each month.
When the annual OPTAR obligations were initially examined,
the distribution did not appear to be normally distributed. Figure 2
shows the histogram of annual OPTAR obligations for Frigates over the
two years studied. Note the bi-modal distribution, and the appearance
of a distinct "break" in the data in the $1 million region.
The apparent cause of this abnormal distribution, as well as
the "break" in the data, is the fact that the levels of funding allocated
to and obligated by the frigates differed over the two years studied. As
previously mentioned, the amount of funding provided the ships actu-
ally went down between FY 1985 and 1986. The cause for this differ-
ence in funding levels is unknown, and is not important for purposes
of data analysis. The effects of this differential in funding can be
accounted for in the analysis by using "percentage of annual OPTAR
expended" as the dependent variable in certain calculations
(discussed further in a later section). It is only important to recognize
that the annual OPTAR obligations are not normally distributed when
viewed over the two-year period as a whole (certain analysis tech-
niques are only meaningful when data is normally distributed).
The apparent drop in obligation levels from fiscal year 1985 to
1986 was a function of budgetary constraints. The amount of OPTAR
allocated to the ships was larger in 1985 than it was in 1986.
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Figure 2
Histogram of Annual OPTAR Obligations
Frigates (1985-1986)
When the histograms are observed for each year on an indi-
vidual basis, different distribution patterns can be observed. Figures 3
and 4 are the histograms for the annual obligations for FY 1985 and Fy
1986.
Figure 3 shows that the distribution of annual OPTAR obliga-
tions for 1985 is somewhat closer to normal. The continued presence
of distinct "breaks" in the data and the apparent outliers can be
attributed to the fact that there is such a small sample size involved
(only ten ships). Nonetheless, it is difficult to state for certain
whether or not the data is or is not normally distributed.
Figure 4 shows that the annual OPTAR obligations for fiscal
year 1986 also do not appear to be normally distributed. The pres-
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Histogram of Annual OPTAR Obligations
Frigates— 1985
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Figure 4
Histogram of Annual OPTAR Obligations
Frigates— 1986
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The number of days underway per month was another variable
examined in the analysis. Over the two-year period examined, each
ship was underway approximately 11.4 days per month. Again, the
standard deviation was relatively high at 8.8 days per month.
Additionally, the data was not normally distributed. Figure 5 shows
the histogram for the number of days underway per month for Frigates
over the two year period studied. As can be seen, were it not for the
large number of months in which the ships were underway zero days,
the distribution would have appeared to approximate a normal distri-
bution much more closely. With this in mind, an attempt was made to
"normalize" the distribution by removing select groups of ships that
did not get underway during a given month.
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Figure 5
Histogram of Days U/W per month
Frigates (1985-1986)
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The first step was to remove all ships from the data set who
were in overhaul for all or part of any month in which the ship did not
get underway. When this was done, very little improvement was noted
in the distribution in terms of making it more "normal." There were
still a large number of months in whichships had zero days underway,
so an additional step was taken in an attempt to smooth the data and
obtain a more normal distribution.
This next step involved removing from the data set all ships
that were either in regular overhaul or in a Selected Restricted
Q
Availability (SRA) during any month in which the ship had zero days
underway. As can be seen from the histogram below (Figure 6),
removal of this data still had no appreciable effect on improving the
normality of the distribution.
As a last resort, all data points for ships that had no underway
days in a given month were removed from the data set, regardless of
the reason the ship did not get underway during the month. The
histogram for this data set (Figure 7) finally showed some improve-
ment in normalizing the distribution.
^Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) is a scheduled mainte-
nance period in which the ship is normally in a repair status and
unable to get underway for anywhere from two to three months. The
maintenance period is normally conducted in the ship's homeport,
and involves both tender and shore based maintenance support, often
including local shipyard participation. The SRA is often viewed as a
"mini-overhaul."
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Figure 6
Histogram of Days U/W per month
Frigates (1985-1986)
(less ships in Overhaul or SRA)
Figure 7
Histogram of Days U/W per month
Frigates (1985-1986)
(less all ships with zero u/w days in a given month)
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The final variable examined in the analysis was the number of
months since last regular scheduled overhaul. For the Frigates
included in this study, the average number of months since last over-
haul was 26, with a standard deviation of 19 months. The histogram of
this variable is as shown in Figure 8. It should be noted that the





Histogram of Months since last Overhaul
Frigates (1985-1986)
The skewness of the above distribution can be partially
explained by the fact that within the data, there were several ships
that were undergoing overhaul within the two-year period examined.
During any given month in which a ship was undergoing a scheduled
overhaul, the ship was assigned a value of zero for the variable "months
since last overhaul." This had the effect of skewing the data somewhat
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to the right. Were it not for this induced skewness. the data would
have been more normally distributed, but probably not enough to be
considered a true normal distribution.
2. BELKNAP (CG-26) Class Cruisers
As stated previously, all five of the BELKNAP class cruisers
assigned to the U.S. Pacific Fleet were included in the study. One of
the cruisers was homeported overseas (Subic Bay, PI), while the
remainder were assigned to homeports in the continental U.S.
As can be seen from the data in Appendix B, the cruisers
were considerably more expensive to operate than the frigates. Over
the two year period studied, each cruiser obligated, on the average,
$2.87 million dollars per year for operations and maintenance
expenses. Just as was the case for the frigates, the cruisers also obli-
gated more in fiscal year 1985 than they did in fiscal year 1986. The
mean annual OPTAR expenditure for fiscal year 1985 was $3.11
million dollars, while the mean for fiscal year 1986 was $2.63 million
dollars per ship. The standard deviation was $430,000 in 1985 and
$374,000 in 1986.
The average monthly OPTAR obligation for cruisers over the
two year period studied was $239,436. The data were widely dis-
persed about this mean, with a standard deviation of over $116,000.
The monthly OPTAR obligations over the two year period for
the cruisers studied appear to be fairly normally distributed. The
histogram in Figure 9 shows the distribution for the monthly OPTAR
obligations for cruisers in the study.
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The monthly OPTAR obligation data for each cruiser was also
converted to percentage of total annual OPTAR obligated. The average
monthly percentage of total annual OPTAR expended was approxi-
mately 8.33% (with a standard deviation of 3.945%). The mean of
8.33% is what would be expected for a normal distribution in which
each ship is "on the average" obligating approximately one -twelfth
(8.33%) of its annual OPTAR each month.
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Figure 9
Histogram of Monthly OPTAR Obligations for Cruisers
As was the case with the frigates, when the annual OPTAR
obligation totals were examined for the cruisers in the study, the dis-
tribution did not appear to be normal. However, with only five
cruisers included in the study, there were not enough observations
available to make any firm conclusions concerning the distribution of
annual OPTAR
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The number of days underway per month was another variable
examined in the analysis. Over the two year period, each cruiser was
underway approximately 11.13 days per month. Again, the standard
deviation was relatively high at 8.8 days per month. Additionally, the
data was not normally distributed. Figure 10 shows the histogram for
the number of days underway per month for Cruisers over the two year
period. As can be seen, were it not for the large number of months in
which the ships were underwayzero days, the distribution would have
come closer to being normal. With this in mind, the same procedure
as was used with the frigates was followed in order to attempt to
"normalize" the distribution by removing select groups of ships that
did not get underway during a given month.
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Figure 10
Histogram of Days U/W per Month
Cruisers (1985-1986)
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The procedure followed resembled that used in the analysis
of the frigates. All months in which a ship did not get underway due
to being in an overhaul or SRA status were removed from the data set.
The revised data set was more normally distributed, but still appeared
to skewed slightly right. Figure 1 1 shows the histogram for this data
set.




Histogram of Days U/W per Month
Cruisers (1985-1986)
(less Ships in Overhaul or SRA)
The final variable examined in the initial analysis of the
cruiser data was the number of months since last regular scheduled
overhaul. Figure 12 shows the histogram for this variable.
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Figure 12
Histogram of Months since last Overhaul
Cruisers (1985-1986)
For the Cruisers included in this study, the average number of
months since last overhaul was 38.3, with the standard deviation being
17 months. The data appears to be fairly normally distributed.
Having conducted a brief overview of the data collected for
the thesis, the next step was to study the OPTAR obligation patterns
and determine their degree of dependence on various employment
variables that were available. The first portion of the study involved
both simple and multiple regression analysis.
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
1. KNOX (FF-1052) Class Frigates
The initial analysis of the KNOX class frigate data revolved
around attempting to determine what relationship, if any, exists
between monthly OPTAR obligation and the number of days underway
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in a given month. Since a ship's schedule tends to revolve around its
underway periods, it seemed only natural to investigate this relation-
ship first.
First, a simple regression was carried out using "monthly
OPTAR obligation" as the dependent variable, and "days underway" as
the independent variable. Recall from the previous section that the
dependent variable (monthly OPTAR obligation) was fairly normally
distributed. The independent variable (days U/W) did not exhibit a
normal distribution, but as a starting point in the analysis, this combi-
nation of variables was regressed. The following output resulted from
this initial regression:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR Obligations
Independent variable(s): Days U/W
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 89897.55 5345.50 16.82
Days U/W 193.67 372.20 0.52
F-Ratio: 0.271
Coefficient of Determination 0.001
Coefficient of Correlation 0.034
Standard Error of the Estimate 50461.763
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.106
The above data seems to indicate that monthly OPTAR obliga-
tions are not dependent on how many days the ship is underway in a
given month. First, the t-ratio for the independent variable is
extremely low (as is the F ratio), indicating that this variable is not
statistically significant in explaining monthly OPTAR obligations.
When the plot of the above variables is examined, there appears to be
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little statistical relationship between the two variables used in the
regression. Figure 13 shows the plot of the dependent versus the




















Plot of Monthly OPTAR vs. Days Underway
Note that the regression line resulting from this regression is
nearly parallel to the X-axis of the graph. This would indicate that the
mean of the dependent variable (Y-bar) is probably just as good a pre-
dictor as the regression equation— thus the reliability of the equation is
extremely low. The resultant coefficients of determination and corre-
lation support this conclusion.
The next step was to convert the monthly obligations into
"percentage of total annual OPTAR obligated," in order to see if the
relationship could be improved any by smoothing out any inflationary
or deflationary effects of the change in OPTAR allocations over the two
fiscal years in the study. When the percentage of total annual OPTAR
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obligated was regressed against days underway, the following output
resulted:
Dependent variable: Percent of annual OPTAR obligated
Independent variable(s): Days Underway
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 8.13 .48 16.81
Days U/W .02 .03 .70
F-Ratio: .502
Coefficient of Determination 002
Coefficient of Correlation 046
Standard Error of the Estimate 4.568
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.178
As can be seen from the information above, there was no sig-
nificant improvement in the regression as a result of converting the
monthly OPTAR obligation into a percentage of annual OPTAR
expended. The t-ratio still indicates that the independent variable
(days underway) is not statistically significant in explaining the
behavior of the dependent variable (percent of annual OPTAR obli-
gated). The plot of the dependent versus independent variable of this
regression is shown in Figure 14.
Again, the regression line shown is nearly parallel to the X-
axis, indicating that the regression equation does not explain much of
the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting coefficients of

























Percent of Annual OPTAR obligated vs. Days Underway
Recall that the independent variable (days underway) was not
normally distributed. Attempts were made to normalize this variable
in an earlier section of this analysis by removing data points for groups
of ships that had zero days underway in a given month. First, the data
points for those ships that were in overhaul during the two fiscal years
studied were removed from the data set, then ships that were in
either overhaul or SRA were removed, and finally, any data point for a
ship having zero days underway in a given month was removed from
the data set. This manipulation of the data set was done with the idea
that perhaps ship spending was dependent on days underway, but only
if the ship was in a true "operational" status, and not undergoing
overhaul or maintenance which made it impossible for the ship to get
underway in a particular month. This hypothesis also proved to be
false. The next few iterations of the regression analysis attempted to
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regress both the "monthly OPTAR obligation" and the "percentage of
annual OPTAR obligation" against the independent variable "days
underway." The regression output for these iterations were as follows.
First, the monthly OPTAR obligations were regressed against the days
underway for all data points for which the ships were not in overhaul:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR Obligations
Independent variable(s): Days Underway (less ships In
overhaul)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratlo
Constant 87363.66 5812.66 15.03
Days U/W 339.93 384.20 0.88
F-Ratio: 0.78
Coefficient of Determination 0.004
Coefficient of Correlation 0.060
Standard Error of the Estimate 47506.174
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.102
Again, the outcome of the regression failed to show that
monthly OPTAR obligation was related in any way to days underway.
Next, the percent of annual OPTAR obligated was regressed
against the days underway for all ships not in overhaul. The resulting
regression output was as follows:
Dependent variable: Percent of annual OPTAR obligated
Independent varlable(s): Days underway (less ships in
overhaul)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 8.08 0.54 14.90
Days U/W 0.02 0.03 0.76
F-Ratio: 0.58
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Coefficient of Determination 0.003
Coefficient of Correlation 0.052
Standard Error of the Estimate 4.431
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.214
The above output again shows that the dependent variable
(percent of annual OPTAR obligated) is not statistically dependent on
the independent variable (days underway).
Next, a regression of the same variables was conducted for
the data set which excluded all data points for ships that were either
in overhaul or undergoing SRA. The regression output (not shown
here) also failed to show any relationship between the independent
variable (days underway) and either of the two dependent variables
(monthly OPTAR obligation and percent of annual OPTAR obligated).
Finally, all data points for ships that had zero days underway
in any given month were removed from the data set, and the same
simple regression attempts as those above were made. First, the
dependent variable "monthly OPTAR obligation" was used, with the
following regression output resulting:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR obligation
Independent variable(s): Days U/W (less all data points
which include zero-day u/w
months)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 93928.04 7543.61 12.45
Days U/W -15.05 467.98 -0.03
F-Ratio: 0.001
Coefficient of Determination 0.000
Coefficient of Correlation 0.000
Standard Error of the Estimate 49081.90
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.17
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From the above data, it can once again be seen that the inde-
pendent variable (days underway) is not statistically significant as a
predictor of monthly OPTAR obligation. Figure 15 shows the plot of
the monthly OPTAR obligation versus the days underway for all data
points except those with zero underway days in any given month. The
plot shows fairly clearly that there does not appear to be any relation-
ship between the two variables. The nearly horizontal slope of the
regression line indicates that the mean of the dependent variable is


















Plot of Monthly OPTAR vs. Days Underway
(less data points with zero day u/w months)
When this same data file was used to regress percent of
annual OPTAR against days underway, the results were similar to pre-
vious regression attempts. The resulting output below again shows no
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relationship between the two variables. Figure 16 shows the plot of
these two variables, and confirms the lack of any firm relationship.
Dependent variable: Percent of Annual OPTAR obligated
Independent variable(s): Days U/W (less all data points
which include zero-day u/w
months)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 8.60 .70 12.23
Days U/W -0.001 .04 -0.03
F-Ratio: 0.001
Coefficient of Determination 0.000
Coefficient of Correlation 0.002
















Percent of Annual OPTAR Obligated versus Days Underway
(less data points with zero day u/w months)
One final quantitative variable whose relationship to OPTAR
was examined was "months since last overhaul." It seemed natural to
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investigate this variable as it appeared reasonable to assume that the
longer the time since a major overhaul, the more a ship might spend
to keep equipment functioning and in otherwise maintaining opera-
tional readiness. Such proved not to be the case. When both "monthly
OPTAR obligation" and "percent of annual OPTAR obligated" were
regressed against the variable "months since last overhaul," neither of
these two dependent variables could be shown to be statistically
dependent on the time since last overhaul. The regression output
below is representative of the type of output that resulted from all
simple regression attempts when using "months since last overhaul"
as the independent variable.
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR obligations
Independent variable (s): Months since last overhaul
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 90050.29 5484.18 16.42
Mo. since OVHL 78.68 169.11 0.46
F-Ratio: 0.216
Coefficient of Determination 0.001
Coefficient of Correlation 0.030
Standard Error of the Estimate 50467
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.104
The plot of these two variables is as shown in Figure 17. Note
the nearly horizontal slope of the regression line, again indicating that
the mean of the dependent variable is probably as good a predictor as
the resulting regression equation. The coefficients of determination
and correlation above also bear out this conclusion. It can be safely
stated that the amount of OPTAR obligated by a ship in a given month
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is not statistically dependent upon the number of months since last











Monthly OPTAR Obligated vs. Months Since Overhaul
Although the variable "months since last overhaul" did not
appear to be significant in explaining the behavior in OPTAR obligation
when used alone in a simple regression, it was examined further in
several multiple regression iterations. The multiple regression studies
involved using both "months since last overhaul" and "days underway"
as independent variables, with both "monthly OPTAR obligation" and
"percent of annual OPTAR obligated" as dependent variables. The
results from all multiple regression attempts using these two variables
were disappointing, and failed to show a statistically significant rela-
tionship between OPTAR and these two explanatory variables. Of all
the multiple regressions conducted, the one showing the strongest
relationship between variables (although inconclusive) was when
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"monthly OPTAR obligations" for all ships other than those in an over-
haul status were regressed against the two independent variables.
This regression resulted in the following output:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR obligation (all ships
less those in overhaul)
Independent variable(s): Days underway
Months since last overhaul
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 82090.97 8328.27 9.965
Days U/W 384.46 387.51 0.992
Mo since OVHL 162.58 179.94 0.904
F-Ratio: 0.799
Coefficient of Determination 0.007
Coefficient of Correlation 0.086
Standard Error of the Estimate 47526
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.115
Although the above regression showed one of the strongest
relationships for all the regressions conducted for the frigates (note
the t-ratios approaching one (1) and the F statistic of .799), the rela-
tionships are still extremely weak. Again it can be stated that there is
very little statistical relationship between OPTAR obligation and either
"days underway" or "months since last overhaul" among the frigates
studied.
2. BELKNAP fCG-26) Class Cruisers
The analysis of the BELKNAP class cruiser data followed much
the same procedure as that for the frigates. Regression studies were
carried out in order to study the relationship between the ships'
OPTAR obligations and certain employment factors.
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First, a simple regression was carried out using "monthly
OPTAR obligation" as the dependent variable, and "days underway" as
the independent variable. Recall from the previous section that the
dependent variable (monthly OPTAR obligation) was fairly normally
distributed. The independent variable (days U/W) did not exhibit a
normal distribution, but as a starting point in the analysis of the
cruiser data, this combination of variables was regressed. The follow-
ing output resulted from this initial regression:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR Obligations
Independent variable(s): Days U/W
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 208307.55 17109.84 12.17
Days U/W 2788.31 1207.91 2.31
F-Ratio: 5.33
Coefficient of Determination 0.04
Coefficient of Correlation 0.21
Standard Error of the Estimate 114870.65
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72
The above data seems to indicate that for the cruisers in the
study, monthly OPTAR obligations are somewhat more dependent on
how many days the ship is underway in a given month than was the
case for the frigates. First, the t-ratio for the independent variable is
much higher than seen in the frigate studies (as is the F ratio), and
appears to have some statistical significance in explaining monthly
OPTAR obligations. When the plot of the above variables is examined,
there appears to be more of a relationship between the two variables
used in the regression than the similar plot for the frigates in the
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study. Figure 18 shows the plot of the dependent versus the indepen-
dent variable for this initial regression. Of particular interest in this
graph is the fact that while the observations are widely dispersed
about the regression line, the variance appears to be constant and the

















Plot of Monthly OPTAR vs. Days Underway
This indicates that there is at least some "advantage" to using
the regression equation to explain the behavior of the OPTAR
expenditures when compared to simply using the mean of the OPTAR
obligations as a predictor. The resultant coefficients of determination
and correlation bear this out as well, with both being considerably
higher than similar statistics obtained in the studies of the frigate data.
Further tests of the validity of this model were carried out by con-
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ducting an analysis of the residuals. The assumption of constant vari-





























-10 20 30 40
Days U/W
Figure 19
Plot of Residuals (initial regression)
As can be seen from the plot of the residuals versus the inde-
pendent variable, the error terms are fairly randomly distributed and
the constant variance assumption appears to be upheld. The normality
of the residual terms is seen in Figure 20, a histogram of the residuals
in this model.
The histogram shows the data to be skewed slightly to the
right, indicating that the residuals are not as normally distributed as
desired. Although the results of the initial regression of the cruiser
data indicated a much stronger relationship between OPTAR and days
underway than was the case for the frigates, the initial model was still
weak. The coefficients of correlation and determination both indicate
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that the model still does not explain much of the variation of the
dependent variable, and for this reason, the analysis continued.




Histogram of Residuals (initial regression)
The next step was to convert the monthly obligations into
"percentage of total annual OPTAR obligated," in order to see if the
model could be improved by smoothing out any inflationary or defla-
tionary effects of the change in OPTAR allocations over the two fiscal
years in the study. When the percentage of total annual OPTAR obli-
gated was regressed against days underway, the following output
resulted:
Dependent variable: Percent of annual OPTAR obligated
Independent variable(s): Days Underway
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 7.41 0.58 12.701
Days U/W 0.08 0.04 1.976
F-Ratio: 3.906
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Coefficient of Determination 0.033
Coefficient of Correlation 0.180
Standard Error of the Estimate 3.921
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.860
As can be seen from the above, when the OPTAR obligations
were converted to "percentage of total annual OPTAR" and regressed
against "days underway," the resulting regression showed no
improvement over the original regression. In fact, this new regression
appears to be less valid than the original. The t-ratios and F statistics
actually got worse, as did the coefficient of correlation and coefficient
of determination. This decline alone is not alarming considering this
new model on its own, but it does cause the original model to be
somewhat questionable. The whole reason for converting the data
from the aggregate figures to the percentages of annual OPTAR was to
smooth out any effect of the differential in funding allocation for the
two years studied (the ships were allocated more OPTAR in 1985 than
they were in the following year 1986). One would have expected the
new model to show some improvement over the original, since the
effects of regressing essentially two populations against one variable
would have been removed. Since the revised model actually appears to
be less valid than the original, then the validity of the original model
can also be considered somewhat questionable. Nonetheless, the
analysis continued to explore other possible relationships.
Recall that the independent variable (days underway) was not
normally distributed. Attempts were made to normalize this variable
in an earlier section of this analysis by removing data points for groups
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of ships that had zero days underway in a given month. First, the data
points for any ships that were in overhaul during the two fiscal years
studied were removed from the data set, then ships that were in
either overhaul or SRA were removed, and finally, any data point for a
ship having zero days underway in a given month was removed from
the data set. This manipulation of the data set was done with the idea
that perhaps ship spending was dependent on days underway, but only
if the ship was in a true "operational" status, and not undergoing
overhaul or maintenance which made it impossible for the ship to get
underway in a particular month. This hypothesis also proved to be
false. The next few iterations of the regression analysis attempted to
regress both the "monthly OPTAR obligation" and the "percentage of
annual OPTAR obligation" against the independent variable "days
underway." The results of these iterations were as follows:
None of the cruisers in this study were in overhaul during the
two year period for which data was collected. Therefore, the removal
of observations involves only those data points for ships that had zero
days underway in a given month due to being in an SRA status. Using
this revised data file, the monthly OPTAR obligations were regressed
against the variable "days underway" with the following results:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR obligations
Independent variable(s): Days U/W (less ships in ROH/SRA)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 203810.65 18537.14 10.99
Days u/w 2944.09 1236.51 2.38
F-Ratio: 5.669
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Coefficient of Determination 0.052
Coefficient of Correlation 0.228
Standard Error of the Estimate 107105.16
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.91
As can be seen from above, there was a slight improvement in
the regression model (when compared to the initial regression) as a
result of using the revised data file. The t-statistic increased from
2.31 to 2.38, the coefficient of determination increased from 0.04 to
0.052, and the coefficient of correlation increased from 0.21 to 0.228.
Whether or not these slight increases are meaningful is questionable
in light of the fact that the numbers are already so small. The plot of
this revised model is as shown in Figure 21, and was not significantly-













Plot of Monthly OPTAR vs. Days Underway
(less Ships in Overhaul or SRA)
The analysis of residuals also did not result in any changes
from the initial residual analysis. The residual plot of this regression
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is shown in Figure 22. The plot shows the error terms to be fairly
randomly distributed, and supports the equal variance assumption









Plot of Residuals vs. Independent Variable (Days U/W)
The same regression analysis was conducted using "percent
of total annual OPTAR obligated" as the dependent variable and "days
underway" as the independent variable to determine if any improve-
ment in the model resulted. As in the initial regression, there was no
improvement in the regression as a result of using "percent of total
annual OPTAR obligated" as the dependent variable. In fact there was
again a decrease in the t-statistic, F-ratio, and coefficients of correla-
tion and determination (because the model failed to show improve-
ment, the actual output is not shown here).
The final simple regression involved revising the data set
once again. This time, all data points with any zero day underway
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months, for whatever the reason, were removed from the data set.
First, the dependent variable "monthly OFTAR obligation" was used,
with the following regression output resulting:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR obligation
Independent variable(s): Days U/W (less all data points
which include zero-day u/w
months)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 212002.85 19925.23 10.64
Days U/W 2492.79 1303.54 1.91
F-Ratio: 3.65
Coefficient of Determination 0.036
Coefficient of Correlation 0.189
Standard Error of the Estimate 108008.311
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.861
Note from the above output that this final revision of the data
set failed to improve the relation between OPTAR obligated and days
underway. The removal of all zero day underway months from the data
set actually resulted in a decline in the t-statistic, the F-ratio, and the
coefficients of correlation and determination. The plot of Monthly
OPTAR obligation versus Days Underway is as shown in Figure 23. The
plot is not significantly different from those of previous regressions.
The conclusion to be drawn is that when all zero day underway months
are removed from the data set, there is no improvement in the rela-
tionship between the monthly OPTAR obligated and the number of
days during the month that the ship gets underway. Although not
shown here, the results of the regression of "percent of total annual
OPTAR obligated" against "days underway" yielded much the same
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results. When these two variables were regressed, the key statistics
again decreased, indicating that the relationship was not improved by













Plot of Monthly OPTAR vs. Days Underway
(less data points with zero day u/w months)
Finally, as was done with the frigates, the variable "months
since last overhaul" was examined to determine whether any relation-
ship between this variable and the amount of OPTAR obligated exists
for cruisers. When examined by itself in a simple regression, this
variable failed to prove significant in explaining the behavior of cruiser
OPTAR obligation patterns. When "monthly OPTAR obligated" was
regressed against the variable "months since last overhaul," the
following output resulted:
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Independent varlable(s): Months since last Overhaul
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 232562.77 26332.66 8.83
Mo since OVHL 179.48 628.79 0.28
F-Ratio: 0.081
Coefficient of Determination 0.001
Coefficient of Correlation 0.026
Standard Error of the Estimate 116666.722
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.779
As can be seen from the above, the variable "months since
last overhaul" is not statistically significant in explaining the behavior
of the dependent variable "monthly OPTAR obligated." Figure 24
below is a plot of these two variables, and as can be seen from the
nearly horizontal slope of the resulting regression line, the mean of
the dependent variable (Y-bar) is probably as good a predictor of the
monthly OPTAR obligated as is this particular independent variable
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Figure 24
Monthly OPTAR Obligated vs. Months Since Overhaul
75
Although the variable "months since overhaul" was shown to
not be a good predictor of monthly OPTAR when used alone in a
simple regression, one final attempt was made at using this variable,
this time in a multiple regression. Since the data file for cruisers
which excluded all data points for ships in overhaul or SRA proved to
result in the best simple regression when using "days underway" as
the independent variable, this data file was again used in this multiple
regression. When "monthly OPTAR obligated" was regressed against
both "days underway" and "months since last overhaul," the following
output resulted:
Dependent variable: Monthly OPTAR Obligated
Independent variable(s): Months since last Overhaul
Days Underway (less ships in
overhaul or SRA)
Variable name Coefficient Std Error t-ratio
Constant 206973.51 29512.65 7.013
Days U/W 2954.48 1244.71 2.374
Mo. since OVHL -85.46 618.54 -0.138
F-Ratio: 2.817
Coefficient of Determination 0.052
Coefficient of Correlation 0.229
Standard Error of the Estimate 107618.844
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.916
From the above output, it can be safely concluded that the
variable "months since last overhaul" adds very little to the regression
in terms of explaining the behavior of the dependent variable (monthly
OPTAR obligated). First of all, it should be noted that the t-statistic for
the variable "months since last overhaul" is extremely low, and is not
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statistically significant. Additionally, the addition of the new variable
caused a significant decrease in the F-statistic (down from 5.669 in
the original regression of this data file), confirming that the addition
of this variable does not improve the regression.
To summarize briefly the results of the regression analysis for
both the frigates and the cruisers in this study, the following key
points can be made:
• In the case of frigates, OPTAR obligation is not statistically depen-
dent upon either days underway or the number of months since
last overhaul.
• In the case of cruisers, there does appear to be some relationship
between OPTAR obligation and days underway, but not between
OPTAR obligation and the number of months since last overhaul.
Although the variable "days underway" is of some significance in
explaining the behavior of monthly OPTAR obligations, there is
not a strong enough relationship to justify using "days underway"
as a predictor of monthly OPTAR spending.
C. VARIANCE ANALYSIS
Having been unable to develop a statistically significant parametric
model for predicting monthly OPTAR obligations, the study of the
data next focused on non-parametric analysis in an effort to examine
potential relationships between operational employment and OPTAR
obligation. The non-parametric studies involved variance analysis in
order to determine if indeed there were differences in OPTAR
spending that could be associated with the operational employment of
a ship.
The first step in this analysis involved manipulating the data to
allow comparisons of mean spending in each employment category
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(using an analysis of variance between various samples of data). As dis-
cussed in chapter three, the OPTAR spending data was broken down
into ten-day increments, as shown in Appendix A. The employment
data was also broken down into ten-day increments in order to make
direct comparisons between the "ten-day spending" and the "ten-day
employment." Appendix B contains the ships' employment data
Q
broken down into ten-day increments.
The next step involved sorting the data for each class of ship into
the various employment categories. The ten-day spending data for
frigates were sorted into eight data files, one for each of the eight
employment categories. For example, all data points for ten-day
OPTAR obligations for Frigates who were in a deployed status were
sorted into their own file entitled "deployment. " The same procedure
was then used to sort the Cruiser data, except that only seven of the
eight employment categories were used, due to the fact that there
were no cruisers in the "overhaul" employment category during the
two years studied.
Once the data was sorted by employment category, the procedure
followed was to conduct a one-way analysis of variance between the
The ten-day employment information contained in Appendix B
was based upon the author's analysis of the detailed scheduling data
provided by the COMNAVSURFPAC Operations Office. In any ten-day
period a ship might have been employed in more than one primary
activity. Because of this, a degree of subjective judgement was
required on the part of the author (based upon seven years of sea duty
in similar ships) in deciding which of the eight primary employment
categories was "driving" the ship's routine during any given ten-day
period.
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various employment categories. The one-way analysis of variance
would identify which of the categories, if any, were influential in driv-
ing OPTAR obligations during the two years studied. Prior to dis-
cussing the resulting variance studies, a brief overview of the data used
in the analysis is provided.
On the basis of the breakdown of the raw data into the ten-day
increments used in the analysis, certain trends in the data were noted.
Figures 25 and 26 show graphically the breakdown of each class of
ship's employment data in terms of the percentage of time spent in
the various employment categories over the two years in the study
(these graphs show the aggregated information for all the data points













Percentage of Time Spent in Various Activities
(Frigates, 1985-1986)
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Figures 25 and 26 are in and of themselves of little value in the
analysis other than for information purposes. The two graphs merely
show what percentage of time each class of ship spent in the various
employment categories. However, when these two graphs are com-
pared with Figures 27 and 28, certain subjective (albeit preliminary)
















Percentage of Time Spent in Various Activities
(Cruisers, 1985-1985)
First, an explanation of Figures 27 and 28 is in order so that a
proper interpretation of the two graphs and a proper comparison with
Figures 25 and 26 are possible. Figures 27 and 28 represent the per-
centage of the total OPTAR obligated, for each class of ship, broken
down by the employment category the ships were in when the OPTAR
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funds were obligated. In other words, these graphs explain what per-
centage of the OPTAR was obligated, and "when" it was obligated.
For example, Figure 27 should interpreted as follows: the frigates
in the study obligated 12.9% of their total OPTAR while in a mainte-
nance category, 16.1% while in a deployed status, 23.3% while in
upkeep, and so on. The remaining percentages are as shown along the
















Percentage of Total OPTAR Obligated in Various Activities
(Frigates, 1985-1986)
In the case of the cruiser data shown in Figure 28, the percent-
ages differed somewhat. Cruisers obligated 22.5% of their OPTAR
while in a maintenance status, 21.9% while deployed, 18.2% while in
upkeep, and so on as shown in Figure 28. Note the presence of only
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seven employment categories for this chart since none of the cruisers
were in overhaul during the period of the study.
When the two sets of pie charts are compared for each class of
ship (i.e., Figure 25 versus Figure 27 and Figure 26 versus Figure 28),
it would be expected that, if operational employment had a significant
impact on OPTAR obligation, there should be significant differences in
the way each chart looks. Conversely, if employment does not signifi-
cantly impact on OPTAR obligation, then one would expect that the
graphs for each class of ship would look similar, indicating that the
ships are obligating their money at a somewhat even rate that is not
















Percentage of Total OPTAR Obligated in Various Activities
(Cruisers, 1985-1986)
82
For example, the frigates in the study spent 13.2% of their time
in maintenance, and while in maintenance periods, obligated 12.9% of
their total OPTAR. The frigates spent 9.9% of their time in overhaul,
and obligated 10% of their OPTAR while in overhaul. They spent
16.1% of their time deployed, and while deployed, obligated 15.7% of
their total OPTAR. The remaining comparisons can be made by
reviewing Figures 25 and 27. The point to be made is that if employ-
ment were a driving factor in the obligation of OPTAR, one would not
expect the OPTAR obligation percentages to be so similar to the per-
centages of time spent in each employment category. If operational
employment tended to drive OPTAR obligation, then one would expect
that during certain categories of employment, a larger percentage of
total OPTAR would be obligated, while in other categories a smaller
percentage of total OPTAR would be obligated. Given the charts shown
in Figures 25 and 27, it would appear that the obligation of OPTAR
tends to be fairly evenly distributed throughout the period studied,
and does not appear to be dependent upon any specific employment
category. A similar situation, although to a lesser extent, can be seen
in the data for the cruisers in the study as shown by a comparison of
Figures 26 and 28.
The above interpretation of Figures 25 through 28 is subjective in
nature, but is supported by statistical analysis which shows that there
is no significant difference between the two sets of data. To statisti-
cally test whether or not there was a significant difference between
the proportions in Figures 25 and 26 and those in Figures 27 and 28.
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a Chi-square goodness of fit test was conducted for both the frigate
and cruiser data.
In a Chi-square goodness of fit test, two sets of proportions are
statistically compared to determine whether or not they differ signifi-
cantly. The Chi-square goodness of fit test is used to test the
hypothesis that several proportions have specified numerical values, or
that two sets of proportions do not differ significantly.
In the case of the frigate data, a goodness of fit test was conducted
to determine whether or not there was a significant difference
between the proportions in Figure 27, representing the percentage of
total OPTAR obligated while a ship is in the various employment cate-
gories, and the proportions contained in Figure 25, which represent
the percentage of time the ships spent in the various employment
categories. The results of the Chi-square test for goodness of fit were
as follows:
Null Hypothesis : The proportions associated with Figure 25 do
not differ significantly from the proportions found
in Figure 27. (There is no significant difference
between the percentage of OPTAR obligated by a
frigate in any specific employment category and
the percentage of time spent in that same
category.)
Alternative Hypothesis : The proportions contained in Figures
25 and 27 differ significantly. (There is. a signifi-
cant difference between the percentage of OPTAR
obligated by a frigate in any specific employment




Computed value of Chi-square test statistic: 0.6563
Critical value of Chi-square = 14.0671 (alpha = 0.05, 7 d.f.)
As shown above, the computed value of Chi-square is, extremely
small, and is much lower than the critical value. Since the computed
value of Chi-square is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected. Acceptance of the null hypothesis supports the
earlier conclusion that there is no significant difference between the
two sets of proportions.
The same goodness of fit test was conducted with the cruiser data
shown in Figures 26 and 28. The results from this test were similar to
the above and were as follows:
Null Hypothesis : The proportions associated with Figure 26 do
not differ significantly from the proportions found
in Figure 28 (There is no significant difference
between the percentage of OPTAR obligated by a
cruiser in any specific employment category and
the percentage of time spent in that same
category).
Alternative Hypothesis : The proportions contained in Figures
26 and 28 differ significantly. (There is a signifi-
cant difference between the percentage of OPTAR
obligated by a cruiser in any specific employment
category and the percentage of time spent in that
same category.)
Test Statistic: Chi-square
Computed value of Chi-square test statistic: 1.9009
Critical value of Chi-square = 12.5916 (alpha = 0.05. 6 d.f.)
Although the value of the computed Chi-square is considerably
larger for the cruisers than it was for the frigates, it is still not
statistically significant. The computed value of Chi-square is less than
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its critical value, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. As
before, acceptance of the null hypothesis supports the earlier conclu-
sion that there is no significant difference between the sets of propor-
tions in Figures 26 and 28.
The Chi-square tests seem to support the initial conclusion that
there is no relationship between OPTAR obligation and the operational
employment of a ship. To confirm this conclusion, further testing of
the data was conducted. The next step in the study involved variance
analysis of the OPTAR obligation data, and the following sections dis-
cuss the results of the variance analysis conducted for the two classes
of ships involved.
1. KNOX (FF-1052) Class Frigates
The initial analysis of the KNOX class frigate data involved a
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the eight operational employ-
ment categories. In conducting this initial analysis, the null and alter-
native hypotheses were as follows:
Null Hypothesis : The mean OPTAR obligation during any
ten-day period does not vary on the basis of
operational employment (the means of OPTAR
obligated for each of the categories of employment
are equal).
Alternative Hypothesis : The mean OPTAR obligation during any
ten-day period does vary depending on operational
employment (one or more of the means of each of
the employment categories are not equal).
In conducting the analysis of variance, the objective was to
either accept or reject the null hypothesis on the basis of a test statis-
tic, in this case the resulting F-ratio. On the basis of either accep-
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tance or rejection of the null hypothesis above, it would be possible to
state whether or not operational employment is statistically significant
as a determinant of OPTAR obligation rates. When the initial analysis
of variance was conducted, the following output resulted:
Analysis of Variance: Frigate OPTAR Obligations by Employment
SOURCE DF iSS MS F-RATIO
Employment 7 4.70' xlCK'9 671381760 0.81
ERROR 712 5.90 xlO'ai 828491776
TOTAL 719 5.95 xlO'k ll
Employment Number Mean Standard
Categorv Observations OPTAR Deviation
Maintenance 95 $29446 $19087
Deployment 113 $30920 $22390
Upkeep 181 $27919 $22898
Training 51 $27053 $20099
Exercises 44 $36656 $24362
Inspections 38 $26515 $54184
Underway 127 $32706 $26331
Overhaul 71 $30399 $48317
From the information above, it can be seen that the F-ratio
resulting from this one-way analysis of variance is extremely low, and
can not be considered statistically significant. If the value of alpha (the
probability of making a type I statistical error) for this analysis is set at
0.05 (in order to be 95% certain that we do not make a type I error
and reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact true), then the critical
value of F would be 2.01. Since the actual value of the F-ratio is 0.81,
and does not exceed this critical value of F, we can safely accept the
null hypothesis, and conclude that the means of the various employ-
ment categories are equal. This indicates that, for the Frigates in the
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study, there is no difference in the amount of OFTAR obligated from
one employment category to another. In other words, OPTAR obliga-
tion does not depend on the employment of the ship. Because of the
extremely low F-ratio computed for this initial analysis, no further
analysis of the data was considered necessary for the Frigates. The
null hypothesis would be accepted at almost all levels of alpha, and
therefore the study moved on into an analysis of the cruiser data.
2. BELKNAP (CG-26) Class Cruisers
The initial analysis of the BELKNAP class cruiser data involved
the same procedure as was used in the frigate analysis, a one-way anal-
ysis of variance for the seven employment categories used for the
cruisers in the study. In conducting this analysis, the null and
alternative hypotheses were identical to those used in the frigate
analysis:
Null Hypothesis : The mean OPTAR obligation during any
ten-day period does not vary on the basis of
operational employment (the means of OPTAR
obligated for each of the categories of employment
are equal).
Alternative Hypothesis : The mean OPTAR obligation during any
ten-day period does vary depending on operational
employment (one or more of the means of each of
the employment categories are not equal).
In conducting the analysis of variance, the objective was again
to either accept or reject the null hypothesis on the basis of a test
statistic, in this case the resulting F-ratio. When the initial ANOVA
was conducted for the cruisers in the study, the following output
resulted:
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Analysis of Variance: Cruiser OPTAR Obligations by Employment
SOURCE DF iSS MS F-RATIO
Employment 6 4.55' xlO' 10 7.58 xK)A9 2.12
ERROR 353 1.26 xlO''12 3.58 xlC)A9
TOTAL 359 1.30 xlO* 12
'
Employment Number Mean Standard
Category Observations OPTAR Deviation
Maintenance 92 $70752 $53575
Deployment 78 $81251 $60953
Upkeep 67 $78423 $57422
Training 31 $98540 $56907
Exercises 26 $98955 $85181
Inspections 18 $104753 $79398
Underway 48 $68527 $48711
Unlike the results of the initial frigate analysis, the value of
the F-ratio resulting from this ANOVA can be considered statistically
significant. Using an alpha value of 0.05, the critical value of F for this
ANOVA would be 2.10. Since the F-ratio resulting from this analysis is
greater than the critical value of F (at alpha = 0.05), the null hypoth-
esis can be rejected (but just barely). The resulting conclusion
would be that for the cruisers in the study, at least one of the mean
OPTAR expenditures involved in the comparison of the means for the
various employment categories is not equal. This would indicate that,
for cruisers, there is some relationship between operational employ-
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at an alpha of less than
0.05. For example, if the value of alpha is set at the 0.01 level of sig-
nificance, the critical value of F is 2.80, a value considerably larger
than the F-ratio resulting from this ANOVA. Therefore, if it were
necessary to have a 99% probability of not making a type I statistical
error, then the null hypothesis could be safely accepted.
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ment and the amount of OPTAR obligated. The next steps in the anal-
ysis involved identifying which category or categories of employment
did not have a mean that was equal to the other mean OPTAR
obligations.
To accomplish this, the analysis of variance procedures were
conducted on various combinations of the seven employment cate-
gories, in order to isolate which variable or variables differed signifi-
cantly in terms of the sample means. To simplify this procedure (by
reducing the number of iterations necessary), certain groupings of
variables were analyzed first, in order to confirm that there was no
significant differences in the means of these variables (thus effectively
eliminating them from the analysis).
First, an analysis of variance was conducted for the three
employment categories with the highest mean OPTAR obligation per
ten-day period. As shown earlier in the output from the one-way anal-
ysis of variance previously conducted, these three employment vari-
ables were "training," "exercises," and "inspections." The following
are the results of the analysis of variance for these three employment
categories:
Null Hypothesis : The means of the ten-day OPTAR obligations
for the three employment categories are equal.
Alternative Hypothesis : The means of these three employment
categories are not equal (at least one of the means
is significantly different from the others).
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Analysis of Variance: Cruiser OPTAR Obligations by Employment

































From the output above it can be safely concluded that there is
no statistically significant difference in the means of the three cate-
gories of employment. The critical value of F (for an alpha of 0.05) is
approximately 3.1, which is significantly larger than the computed F-
ratio of 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis (that the means of the three
employment categories are equal) may be safely retained.
This same procedure was used for the four employment cate-
gories with the lowest mean OPTAR obligation per ten-day period.
The results of this analysis were as follows:
Null Hypothesis : The means of the ten-day OPTAR obligations
for the four employment categories are equal
Alternative Hypothesis : The means of these four employment
categories are not equal (at least one of the means
is significantly different from the others)
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Analysis of Variance: Cruiser OPTAR Obligations by Employment







































For the above analysis the critical value of F is approximately
2.60 (at an alpha value of 0.05). Since an F-ratio of 0.80 was calcu-
lated, it can be safely concluded that there is no significant difference
in the mean OPTAR obligations per ten-day period between the four
operational employment categories examined.
The two previous ANOVA tests found that the mean ten-day
OPTAR obligations for the three highest cost employment categories
did not differ significantly from one other, and that the mean ten-day
OPTAR obligations for the four lowest cost employment categories also
did not differ significantly from one other. The next step involved
testing to confirm that the mean of the ten-day OPTAR obligations for
the four low cost employment categories was significantly different
from the mean of the ten-day OPTAR obligations for the three high
cost employment categories. This ANOVA was conducted by consoli-
dating the data for the high and low cost categories into two new
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categories, named "high cost" and "low cost." The following are the
results of the analysis of variance for these two new categories:
Null Hypothesis : The mean of the ten-day OPTAR obligations for
the high cost employment categories is not sig-
nificantly different from the mean of the ten-day
OPTAR obligations for the low cost employment
categories.
Alternative Hypothesis : The means of these two categories do
differ significantly from one another
Analysis of Variance: Cruiser OPTAR Obligations by Employment
(Variables used: "High Cost," "Low Cost")
SOURCE DF SS MS F-RATIO
FACTOR 1 3.75 xlOA 10 3.75 xlOA 10 10.56
ERROR 358 1.27 xlOA 12 3.55 xlOA9
TOTAL 359 1.30 xlOA 12
Employment Number Mean Standard
Category Observations OPTAR Deviation
Low Cost 285 $75054 $55789
High Cost 75 $100175 $72243
For the above analysis, the critical value of F is 3.84. Because
the computed value of F (10.56) is significantly higher than the critical
value, the null hypothesis can be safely rejected. This shows that
there i§. a significant difference in the mean of the ten-day OPTAR
obligations between the high cost employment categories and the low
cost employment categories.
The above analysis confirmed the difference between the high
and low cost "groupings" of employment categories, but did not iden-
tify any individual categories of employment that differed from one
another. Obviously, based upon the results of the initial analysis of
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variance wherein it was found that the null hypothesis could be
rejected, there is at least one of the seven employment categories that
has a mean OPTAR obligation rate that is either more or less than the
others. The remainder of this analysis of data focused on identifying
the differing categories of employment through repeated analyses of
variance for different combinations of variables.
The results of this analysis showed that the employment
categories of "maintenance" and "underway" did not have the same
mean OPTAR obligation per ten-day period as did the three higher
cost categories of employment ("training," "exercise," and
"inspection"). The mean ten-day expenditures for these two cate-
gories were found to be significantly lower than for the others. The
following shows the results of the analysis of variance for the category
of "maintenance" when included with the three high cost categories.
Null Hypothesis : The means of the ten-day OPTAR obligations
for the four employment categories are equal.
Alternative Hypothesis : The means of these four employment
categories are not equal (at least one of the means
is significantly different from the others).
Analysis of Variance: Cruiser OPTAR Obligations by Employment










ERROR 163 6.47 xlOMl
TOTAL 166 6.83 xlOMl
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For the above analysis, the critical value of F is approximately
2.60. At the 0.05 level of significance then, the null hypothesis can
safely be rejected and it can be concluded that the mean OPTAR obli-
gation per ten-day period is different when a ship is in a maintenance
period than when it is in any of the three remaining employment
categories (they were previously shown to have equal means).
The same results were obtained when the category
"underway" was examined in conjunction with the three higher cost
categories. For example, when an analysis of variance was conducted
using the categories "underway" and "high cost," the following output
resulted:
Null Hypothesis : The means of the ten-day OPTAR obligations
for the two employment categories are equal
Alternative Hypothesis : The means of these two employment
categories are not equal
Analysis of Variance: Cruiser OPTAR Obligations by Employment
(Variables: "Underway," "High Cost")
SOURCE DF SS MS F-RATIO
FACTOR 1 2.93 xlOA 10 2.93 xlOA 10 7.13
ERROR 121 4.97 xlOA ll 4.11 xlOA9
TOTAL 122 5.27 xlOA ll
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Employment Number Mean Standard
Category Observations OPTAR Deviation
Underway 48 $68527 $48711
High Cost 75 $100175 $72243
The critical value of F for the above analysis (at alpha = 0.05)
is approximately 3.92. The computed value of F is significantly higher
than this critical value of F, and the null hypothesis may be safely
rejected. Thus it can be shown that the mean OPTAR obligation per
ten-day period is different when a ship is underway than when it is in
any one of the three higher cost categories of employment
("Training,*' "Exercise," and "Inspection").
Statistically then, only two firm conclusions can be drawn
from the non-parametric analysis of the cruisers involving the analysis
of variance between different employment categories. First, it can be
seen that the cruisers in the study tended to obligate less money in
any ten-day period in which the ship was employed in either an
"underway" or a "maintenance" period than when the ship was in
other "higher cost" employment categories. Second, two different
levels of spending were evident in the analysis, into which the seven
employment categories tended to group themselves. The categories of
"training," "exercise," and "inspection" tended to fall into the "high
cost" spending level, while the remaining four categories fell into the
"low cost" spending level (based on the ten-day OPTAR obligation and
employment data). Because of the non-parametric nature of variance
analysis, these differences in spending levels cannot be quantified.
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only identified and shown to be statistically significant. Further dis-
cussion of the non-parametric studies will be offered in the next
chapter.
3. The Impact of Overseas Homeporting on OPTAR Obligation
The final non-parametric studies of the data involved using
variance analysis to determine whether or not there are differences in
OPTAR obligation that can be attributable to the policy of homeporting
select U.S. Navy ships in foreign overseas ports.
For economic and strategic military reasons, the U.S. Navy
maintains a strong overseas presence in the Pacific Ocean area by
homeporting select warships in certain foreign ports. The use of
these foreign homeports provides for greater flexibility and faster
response by Navy forces operating in the Western Pacific. Transit
times from U.S. ports to operating areas in the Western Pacific and
Indian Ocean are measured in weeks rather than days. In order to
maintain a credible naval presence in certain areas, while at the same
time reducing logistic support problems, the use of overseas home-
ports is essential. Homeporting U.S. Navy ships overseas does create
problems for planners, however, including those involved with
budgeting OPTAR to support such units.
Discussions with COMNAVSURFPAC budget personnel indi-
cated an interest in the issue of OPTAR versus overseas homeporting.
Commanding Officers of some ships in overseas homeports have occa-
sionally claimed that operating and maintenance costs for their ships
are higher than for ships homeported in the United States, and thus
97
overseas units should be budgeted for a larger allocation of OPTAR
funds. Using the OPTAR obligation data collected for this thesis, an
attempt was made to study this problem.
A potential difficulty encountered in studying this problem
resulted from the way in which OPTAR funds were (and are) allocated
by the type commander. As discussed earlier in this thesis, all ships
within a given class are allocated approximately the same amount of
OPTAR each fiscal year. Over the two year period in this study, the
ships were allocated OPTAR without regard to whether or not the unit
was homeported overseas (ships homeported overseas did not auto-
matically receive a larger initial OPTAR allocation at the beginning of
the fiscal year). As mentioned in the last chapter, ships can only obli-
gate OPTAR up to the total amount they are allocated in a given fiscal
year. This being the case, unless the ships homeported overseas found
it necessary to obtain OPTAR augments, and unless these OPTAR aug-
ments are reflected in the OPTAR obligation data collected, then it
only stands to reason that they would not have obligated any more
OPTAR in any fiscal year than the ships homeported in the U.S.
Because of the this problem, it is necessary to interpret results of any
statistical analysis in this area very carefully. The results of the analy-
sis, and the interpretations of these results are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
To analyze the data, a non-parametric procedure similar to
the earlier variance analysis was followed. This time, however, the
monthly OPTAR obligation data was used (rather than the ten-day
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expenditure data), broken down into two samples for each class of
ship— the first sample including ships homeported in U.S. ports, the
second sample including ships homeported overseas. After the data
was separated in this manner, a two-sample, two-tailed, "t-test" was
conducted for both the frigates and the cruisers in the study. The t-
test used was similar to the variance analysis conducted earlier, except
that instead of using the F-ratio as a test statistic to determine
whether or not to accept or reject a null hypothesis, the t-test uses
the "t-statistic" for the same purpose. The results of this analysis
were as follows.
The frigate data was studied first. Recall that four of the ten
ships included in the study were homeported overseas in Yokosuka,
Japan. These included USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF-1067), USS
KIRK (FF-1087), USS KNOX (FF-1052), and USS LOCKWOOD (FF-
1064). The remaining units were homeported in U.S. ports, either in
California or Hawaii. The OPTAR data for the frigates were broken
down into two samples (U.S. Ports, Overseas Ports) and compared
using the t-test. The results of the t-test were as follows:
Null Hypothesis : The mean monthly OPTAR obligation by
frigates homeported in the United States is equal
to the mean monthly OPTAR obligation by ships
homeported overseas.
Alternative Hypothesis : The mean monthly OPTAR obligation by
frigates homeported in the United States is not
equal to the mean monthly OPTAR obligation for
frigates homeported overseas (either one or the
other is higher)
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T-test For KNOX fFF- 10521 Class Shins
Monthly OPTAR Obligation by Homeport
Categories: U.S. Ports Overseas Ports
Mean: $91936 $90131
Std. Deviation $53757 $45519
No.Observations: 144 96
T-statistic (computed) = 0.27
T-statistic (critical) = 1.96 (two tailed, alpha = 0.05)
From the information above, it can be seen that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. The computed value of the t-statistic is
significantly smaller than the critical value of the t-statistic. It is also
interesting to note that the mean monthly OPTAR obligated by frigates
homeported overseas was actually smaller than the mean for the ships
homeported in the U.S.
The acceptance of the null hypothesis in this case calls for
careful analysis in order to draw a meaningful conclusion, however. At
first glance it might seem appropriate to conclude that it does not
cost significantly more to homeport a frigate overseas than it does to
homeport the same ship in the United States. This could be an incor-
rect conclusion. The validity of such a conclusion is dependent upon
the assumption that the overseas units were in fact allocated all the
OPTAR funding that was necessary and appropriate to keep them as
operationally ready as their U.S. based counterparts. If the units
homeported overseas were allocated approximately the same amount
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of annual OPTAR as the U.S. based units, then it only stands to reason
that there would be no difference in mean monthly OPTAR obligations,
since no ship can obligate more OPTAR than it is allocated. In this
case, the results of the t-test above reflect exactly what should be
reflected— that the overseas units obligate the same amount of OPTAR
(on the average) as the U.S. based units, but only because they are allo-
cated the same level of OPTAR as the U.S. based units.
If, and only if, it is correct to assume that the data used in the
analysis does indeed reflect all OPTAR funding necessary and appro-
priate to maintain the overseas homeported frigates at a level of readi-
ness comparable to the U.S. based frigates, then it can be safely con-
cluded that it does not cost significantly more to operate and maintain
frigates in overseas homeports.
The cruiser data was studied next, with essentially the same
results. Only one of the BELKNAP class cruisers in the study was
based overseas, USS STERETT (CG-31), homeported at Subic Bay in
the Philippines. The remaining units were all homeported in San
Diego, California. The t-test for the cruisers involved comparing the
monthly OPTAR obligation data for USS STERETT with the monthly
OPTAR obligation data for all the remaining units. The results of this
analysis were as follows:
Null Hypothesis : The mean monthly OPTAR obligation by
cruisers homeported in the United States is equal
to the mean monthly OPTAR obligation by cruisers
homeported overseas.
Alternative Hypothesis : The mean monthly OPTAR obligation by
cruisers homeported in the United States is not
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equal to the mean monthly OPTAR obligation for
cruisers homeported overseas (either one or the
other is higher)
T-test For BELKNAP fCG-26) Class Ships
Monthly OPTAR Obligation by Homeport
Categories: U.S. Ports Overseas Ports
Mean: $232182 $268457
Std. Deviation $117213 $109692
No.Observations: 96 24
T-statistic (computed) = 1.37
T-statistic (critical) = 1.98 (two tailed, alpha = 0.05)
Although the computed value of the t-statistic is considerably
higher than the corresponding t-statistic for the frigates studied, it is
still not high enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis. The
critical value of the t-statistic is higher than the computed value, thus,
the null hypothesis must be accepted. The conclusion to be drawn
from the acceptance of the null hypothesis in this case is subject to
the same assumption considerations as were discussed in the frigate
analysis. If USS STERETT was allocated the same level of annual
OPTAR funding as the other cruisers in the study, then it is again only
logical that she would obligate the same as the other cruisers in the
study. If, on the other hand, the obligation data does, in fact, reflect
differences in obligation due to being homeported overseas, then
acceptance of the null hypothesis allows one to conclude that it does
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not cost significantly more to homeport a cruiser overseas than it does
in the U.S.
The importance of certain assumptions made in the analysis
of the OPTAR obligation data, and the relationship between these
assumptions and conclusions drawn regarding the analysis of the data
are discussed further in the following chapter.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis began with a discussion of the need for efficient
allocation of OPTAR funds in order to maximize the benefits derived
from such funding. The high cost of operating U.S. Navy ships coupled
with the scarcity of funds in an age of deficit government spending
make it absolutely essential that military fiscal and budget personnel
ensure that OPTAR funds are used wisely and efficiently.
The problems of managing U.S. Navy OPTAR funds are not unlike
the problems associated with cash management in the civilian sector.
The similarities and differences between OPTAR management and
cash management were discussed earlier in this thesis. One key area
of cash management that receives much attention by civilian managers
is the subject of cash budgeting. Ensuring the most efficient use of
cash funds requires a firm to know when cash is most likely to be
needed, and how much funding will be necessary. This requires that a
firm establish a relatively detailed cash budget in order to plan for
cash inflows and outflows. In managing OPTAR allocations for U.S.
Navy ships, the cash "outflows" (obligations) are not budgeted for in
the same manner as they are in the civilian business sector. Once a
total annual OPTAR amount has been established for each ship, this
total amount is allocated on the basis of one-fourth of the annual
amount for each quarter of the fiscal year. No attempt is made to
allocate the OPTAR on the basis of when the ships are most likely to
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need the funds. If budget personnel were better able to predict when
OPTAR funds were likely to be obligated by the ships, then these cash
outflows could be better planned for, resulting in more effective and
efficient use of OPTAR funds.
The primary research question for this thesis was "are there
readily identifiable patterns in the OPTAR obligation rates for the two
classes of ships examined?". A key subsidiary research question was
"if patterns are evident in the spending rates, are these patterns
dependent on the ships' operational scheduling or employment?"
The two questions are very closely related in that the first question
cannot be answered without examining the impact of ship scheduling
and employment on OPTAR obligation, which in turn serves to answer
the second question. This thesis focused on a statistical analysis of the
aggregated OPTAR and scheduling data collected for two classes of
ships in an effort to answer the above questions. If patterns existed in
the data that were readily predictable, then these patterns should have
been identifiable through statistical analysis. The following sections
summarize the findings of the analysis conducted, as well as offer
some conclusions and a discussion of the analysis itself.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The study of the data focused on attempting to establish whether
any significant relationship existed between the amount of OPTAR
obligated by a ship and certain operational employment factors spe-
cific to the ship at the time the OPTAR was obligated.
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First, regression studies were conducted to analyze the relation-
ship between OPTAR obligation and the number of days the ship was
underway in a given month. For both classes of ships, it was found that
monthly OPTAR obligations are not statistically dependent upon the
number of days per month that the ship is underway. In the case of
the frigates, there was almost no relationship between OPTAR and
"days underway." For the cruisers in the study, there was some rela-
tionship found to exist, but not enough to be statistically significant in
allowing prediction of OPTAR obligation based upon a knowledge of
the independent variable "days underway."
Using regression, it was also determined that there is n_p_
relationship between the amount of OPTAR obligated by a ship and the
amount of time that has elapsed since the ship's last overhaul. For
both of the classes of ships examined, the variable "months since last
overhaul" was of no significance in predicting or explaining OPTAR
obligations. This variable also failed to prove significant when included
in a multiple regression using both "days underway" and "months
since last overhaul" as independent variables in predicting OPTAR
obligation.
Next, variance analysis was used to study whether or not any
relationship existed between the operational employment of a ship
(using the eight employment categories discussed in chapter three),
and the amount of OPTAR obligated by a ship in a given ten day period.
The results showed fairly clearly that for the frigates in the study,
there was no significant relationship between operational employment
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and OPTAR obligation. On the average, the frigates tended to obligate
OPTAR fairly evenly throughout the year without regard to operational
employment. There were no operational employment categories that
stood out as being significantly different from the others in terms of
the amount of OPTAR obligated.
For the cruisers in the study, some relationships were apparent,
but none were significant enough to be used in predicting or explain-
ing OPTAR obligations. The non-parametric nature of the variance
analysis conducted did not quantify the relationships, but merely
identified their existence. The results of the variance analysis showed
that the cruiser employment categories tended to fall into two groups,
high cost employment categories and low cost employment categories.
Among the "high cost" group were the following employment
categories:
1. Exercises- at-sea exercise periods (FLEETEX, COMPTUEX,
READEX)
2. Inspections- all inspection periods (OPPE, NTPI, DNSI, ADMAT)
3. Training— refresher and other training periods
The "low cost" group of employment categories for the cruisers
consisted of the following:
1
.
Maintenance— tender availability or other maintenance periods
2. Deployment— scheduled deployment periods overseas
3. Upkeep— routine inport periods, usually in homeport
4. Underway— at-sea periods for local operations or transits
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The exact strength of the relationships could not be measured
using non-parametric studies. The existence of the apparent "break"
in the data between "high cost" and "low cost" employment cate-
gories could be of some use to budget personnel in OPTAR allocation,
however. In budgeting and allocating annual OPTAR, planners could
examine ships' schedules prior to allocation of the funds, and make
use of high cost/low cost employment category averages in allocating
OPTAR for a given period. While this method would not guarantee that
OPTAR would be allocated where it is most needed, it might better
approximate the needs of the ships than simply allocating one-fourth
of the total annual OPTAR figure in each quarter.
The final operational factor studied was in the area homeport
assignments, specifically whether or not overseas homeporting caused
units to obligate more OPTAR than those units homeported in the
United States. The statistical analysis of the data failed to show a sig-
nificant relationship between the annual OPTAR obligated by a ship
and whether or not the ship was homeported overseas. For the
frigates in the study, there was no relationship between the amount of
annual OPTAR obligated and the homeport assignment. For the
cruiser data, the relationship between homeport and annual OPTAR
obligated was stronger than for the frigates, however, this relationship
was still weak, and could not be considered statistically significant.
This interpretation of the homeport analysis called for particular care
due to factors discussed later in this chapter.
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B. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The statistical analysis failed to identify patterns in the OPTAR
obligation data that could be attributable to operational employment
factors. The failure to establish a relationship between operational
employment and OPTAR obligation was an unexpected outcome of the
analysis.
Based on experience and intuitive logic, it would seem perfectly
reasonable to expect some sort of relationship to exist between OPTAR
obligation and operational employment. The higher a ship's opera-
tional tempo, the more stress is placed upon men, machinery and
equipment. With this increased stress should come increased main-
tenance and repair requirements as well as increased usage of con-
sumable materials such as paint, paper products, mooring lines, lubri-
cants and other items. It would seem only appropriate that for any
ship there would be some minimal amount of OPTAR obligation neces-
sary to maintain a basic level of readiness. Above this minimal level, it
would seem logical that increased OPTAR obligation would somehow
be tied to the operational employment of the ship. Such was not the
case, however, as shown in the preceding analysis. Possible explana-
tions for the failure to establish a relationship between these two vari-
ables are discussed below.
First of all, this thesis focused only on total OPTAR obligations.
This aggregate approach to the analysis was taken in order to take an
initial "macro" look at the way OPTAR is obligated by ships. It is also
from this "macro" viewpoint that OPTAR funds are allocated by the
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type commander's budget office. The total amount of OPTAR obligated
by a ship for any period is actually broken down into numerous fund
codes. Table IV below shows the primary fund codes applicable to
Pacific fleet surface ships. The obligation of OPTAR is actually
accounted for not only by total amount of OPTAR obligated but by indi-
vidual fund code as well.
TABLE IV
FUND CODES APPLICABLE TO NAVSURFPAC UNITS
Fund Code Explanation
NA Reimbursable Work
NB Non-aviation depot level repairables
NC NSA consumable materials
ND Rental or hire of passenger vehicle
NE NSA equipment and equipage
NK Charter and Hire services
NM TAD training
NQ TAD administrative travel
NR Equipment maintenance and repair
NU Other purchased services
NV Orders for printing and publications
NY Audiovisual products and costs
N2 Hull and Structural facilities maintenance
N3 Aviation depot level repairables
N7 Medical and Dental
N9 POL and lubricants (other than propulsion
fuels)
It may well be that patterns and trends actually do exist in the
OPTAR obligations, but that the trends and patterns were blurred
somewhat by the aggregate approach taken in this analysis. For
example, repair spending may., in fact, be highly correlated with the
operational employment of the ship. A ship in overhaul might, in fact,
obligate more repair and maintenance OPTAR (fund codes NB, NR and
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N2) than a ship in an upkeep or training period. Identification of such
trends would be possible only through a complete analysis, similar to
the one conducted in this thesis, for each fund code. But even if this
were the case, it still does not explain why the aggregate or total
OPTAR obligations do not appear to be statistically dependent upon
the operational employment of the ship, nor would such information
prove very beneficial to budget personnel attempting to more accu-
rately "schedule" the obligation of OPTAR.
Another possible explanation as to why there was no apparent
relationship between OPTAR obligation and operational employment
has to do with the way OPTAR funds are budgeted and allocated to the
ships, and the traditional approach to spending that has had become
prevalent within the U.S. Government. Within the federal government
there often appears to be an unwritten "rule" of budgeting that essen-
tially requires all agencies to spend (obligate) all allocated funds prior
to the end of any fiscal year. Ensuring that allocated funds are "spent
down to zero" prior to the end of the fiscal year tends to become a
major goal of personnel responsible for OPTAR management aboard
ship. The general line of reasoning used by most budget personnel to
justify such seemingly irrational fiscal behavior revolves around the
fear that "if the money is not spent, then next year it will become
more difficult (if not impossible) to justify OPTAR funding at the
existing (or any higher) level." This "use it or lose it" attitude tends
to be prevalent within all branches of the federal government, includ-
ing the Navy. Discussions with several U.S. Navy Supply Corps Officers
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indicate that whether or not this "rule" is actually codified in writing
and enforced is not the issue. The fact is that most shipboard supply
officers agree that the name of the game is to "spend all that is allo-
cated to you." This attitude would no doubt skew any data collected
for the purpose of analysis and make it difficult if not impossible to
determine whether or not OPTAR obligation is indeed dependent
upon operational employment factors.
Additionally, many supply officers queried by the author felt that if
excess OPTAR funds were "left on the books" at the end of a fiscal
year, that punitive measures would probably be taken against them.
The "punitive" measures cited ranged from reprimand or damaging
fitness reports from the Commanding Officer to an inability to justify
and obtain future OPTAR requests (crippling the supply officer's ability
to obtain emergency augments if needed). Discussions with
COMNAVSURFPAC budget personnel indicate that most of the con-
cerns of the shipboard supply officers were unfounded. As long as the
type commander's budget office is informed in a timely manner
(approximately one month prior to the end of the fiscal year) that
excess OPTAR funds exist onboard any ship, then no such punitive
measures actually exist. Any excess funds are merely "returned" by
the ship to the type commander's budget office to be redistributed to
other ships with high priority unfunded requirements or returned to
the fleet commander for redistribution or reprogramming. When this
established procedure for dealing with excess OPTAR at the end of a
fiscal year was discussed with supply officers, most tended to feel that
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if faced with a choice of "spending the funds down to zero" at the ship
level or returning excess funds to the type commander, then the
choice would be to spend the funds at the shipboard level. . More than
one supply officer felt that although the type commander's office
stated that no punitive action would be taken if excess OPTAR funds
were returned prior to the end of the fiscal year, that such action
would probably result in either a reduction of OPTAR allocation in the
following year, or difficulties in obtaining augments at a later date if
needed.
At any rate, the "spend all you get" attitude would no doubt tend
to make any analysis of OPTAR obligation questionable. For example,
in the analysis of homeport impact on OPTAR obligation it was found
that there was no relationship between OPTAR obligation and home-
port assignment. It was concluded that homeporting a ship overseas
does not cost any more, in terms of OPTAR, than homeporting the
same ship in a U.S. port. As alluded to earlier, such a conclusion is
suspect when it is apparent that all ships, regardless of homeport,
tend to obligate all OPTAR they are allocated, and since it seemed that
all of the ships within a given class were allocated about the same
amount of OPTAR. One could argue that if you were to give a ship
homeported overseas a larger OPTAR allocation, then in all likelihood
the ship would obligate all allocated funding. One could argue further
that this same phenomenon would occur if a ship homeported in a
U.S. port were allocated a larger share of OPTAR than the overseas
units. If one accepts the "spend all you get" philosophy as being
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prevalent in the Navy, then the difficulties in analyzing OPTAR obliga-
tion data and drawing meaningful conclusions become obvious.
One final area of interest is the apparent difference between the
two classes of ships studied with respect to the relationship that
OPTAR obligation rates had with various operational employment
factors. In almost every phase of the analysis, there tended to be a
higher degree of correlation between OPTAR and employment factors
for the cruisers than for the frigates. Although there may be numer-
ous possible explanations for this phenomenon, the most obvious
explanation as to why the cruisers show a higher degree of correlation
may very well rest with the difference in experience levels of the
supply officers assigned to the ships. The cruisers are normally
assigned a more senior and experienced supply officer than the
frigates. This difference in experience could account for the differ-
ences in the relationships found. The higher degree of correlation
between OPTAR and scheduled employment for the cruisers might
reflect a more sophisticated approach to managing OPTAR aboard
cruisers, where not only the supply officer, but all of the senior offi-
cers assigned tend to be more seasoned and experienced than their
contemporaries aboard the frigates. Although this conclusion can not
be proven statistically from the data collected, it may be an area
worthy of further study.
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C. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY
In addition to the above, there were several areas identified in the
course of this study that could be pursued further in analyzing the
relationships between OPTAR obligation and operational employment.
First, and perhaps most importantly, an analysis of the OPTAR
patterns for each individual OPTAR fund code (as shown in Table IV)
might prove to be beneficial. The repair parts fund codes ( codes NB
and NR) might show a higher degree of correlation with operational
employment factors than did the aggregate OPTAR figures looked at in
this thesis. Ships are not allowed to indiscriminately "stockpile"
repair parts and are authorized to order repair items only when they
are actually needed. This is not true of consumables which, in general,
can be ordered at any time. If the repair part fund codes were isolated
and studied by themselves, it is felt that spending patterns might be
more readily identifiable. In any case, the rate at which a ship obli-
gates OPTAR for repair parts probably more accurately reflects the
actual needs of the ship.
The second area where further study would be appropriate relates
to the "spend all that you are allocated" attitude that appears to be
prevalent among most ships. To test this theory, an experiment could
be conducted wherein certain ships in the study would be allocated a
significantly larger OPTAR than normal for a given fiscal year, while
others would be allocated somewhat less OPTAR than normal. The
patterns in spending could then be monitored to determine whether
the ships allocated the significantly larger OPTAR were in fact able to
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"come in under budget." If the "spend all that you are allocated" atti-
tude is prevalent, then it would be expected that these ships (like
most others) would "spend down to zero" rather than return excess
OPTAR funds at the end of the fiscal year.
The next area where further study might be appropriate would
merely be an extension of the above. A thorough study of the attitudes,
practices, procedures and policies regarding the administration of
OPTAR funds aboard ship might prove beneficial in identifying poten-
tial patterns in OPTAR obligation. Interviews with Commanding
Officers, Supply Officers, Department Heads and other key personnel
in the shipboard "fiscal" chain of command might be useful in
explaining "the how and the why" of ships' OPTAR policies. It could
also be useful in identifying any apparent myths regarding OPTAR that
might be prevalent, such as the fear of "punishment" if not all OPTAR
is obligated prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Another area for further analysis would be a study as to the feasi-
bility of implementing a reward /incentive system within the frame-
work of shipboard OPTAR management. Such a system would be
designed to provide incentives and rewards to ships that were able to
manage their OPTAR more efficiently (instead of being "punished" for
having money left over at the end of a fiscal year, a ship would actually
be rewarded in some fashion). The study could involve determining
the appropriate measures of OPTAR efficiency, as well as proposals for
providing incentives and rewards. Similar reward/incentive systems
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have been implemented in other Navy commands with a great deal of
success.
Finally, further study as to the impact of seniority and experience
on the attitudes and policies of supply officers might prove valuable.
As discussed in a previous chapter, the relationship between opera-
tional employment and OPTAR obligation was much greater for the
cruisers in the study than for the frigates. Since the seniority of the
supply officer and other key personnel in the chain of command is the
primary difference between the cruisers and the frigates (other than
the inherent physical differences between the ships), it may just be
that the experience and seniority of the cruiser supply officers is such
that they are better able to manage their OPTAR, obligating funds in a
more rational way and in a pattern that is more closely related to the






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT MAINT MAINT MAINT 2
NOV U/W U/W U/W 17
DEC TRNG INSP UPKP 2
JAN UPKP U/W TRNG 14
FEB TRNG U/W INSP 19
MAR TRNG TRNG TRNG 20
APR U/W EXER U/W 23
MAY MAINT MAINT EXER 10
JUN EXER INSP UPKP 6
JUL MAINT UPKP DEPL 9






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
NOV DEPL DEPL DEPL 26
DEC DEPL DEPL UPKP 19
JAN UPKP MAINT TRNG 2
FEB MAINT U/W MAINT 2
MAR MAINT MAINT MAINT
APR MAINT MAINT MAINT
MAY UPKP UPKP U/W 3
JUN INSP TRNG UPKP 5
JUL U/W INSP MAINT 10
AUG MAINT UPKP UPKP 2
SEP U/W EXER EXER 21






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT TRNG INSP UPKP 8
NOV TRNG U/W MAINT 16
DEC U/W INSP UPKP 11
JAN MAINT EXER UPKP 8
FEB U/W TRNG U/W 18
MAR UPKP MAINT MAINT 8
APR INSP EXER EXER 15
MAY UPKP TRNG EXER 10
JUN EXER MAINT MAINT 6
JUL UPKP UPKP DEPL 12
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 31
SEP DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS UAV
OCT DEPL DEPL DEPL 31
NOV DEPL DEPL DEPL 25
DEC DEPL DEPL DEPL 18
JAN MAINT UPKP UPKP
FEB MAINT INSP U/W 5
MAR TRNG UPKP MAINT 5
APR MAINT MAINT MAINT
MAY MAINT MAINT INSP 2
JUN U/W TRNG EXER 14
JUL EXER U/W U/W 20
AUG MAINT MAINT MAINT
SEP MAINT TRNG TRNG 5






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT DEPL DEPL DEPL 25
NOV DEPL DEPL DEPL 22
DEC DEPL DEPL DEPL 17
JAN MAINT MAINT U/W 4
FEB TRNG MAINT MAINT 6
MAR MAINT MAINT MAINT
APR MAINT MAINT MAINT
MAY MAINT INSP TRNG 6
JUN U/W U/W U/W 19
JUL TRNG U/W EXER 15
AUG U/W UPKP TRNG 12
SEP MAINT MAINT MAINT 3
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT INSP UPKP UPKP 7
NOV UPKP MAINT MAINT 5
DEC MAINT MAINT UPKP 4
JAN UPKP MAINT MAINT 4
FEB MAINT U/W UPKP 6
MAR UPKP UPKP EXER 10
APR EXER MAINT MAINT 14
MAY MAINT U/W TRNG 12
JUN EXER EXER EXER 24
JUL UPKP UPKP UPKP 2
AUG UPKP DEPL DEPL 23
SEP DEPL DEPL DEPL 16




USS WILLIAM H. STANDLEY (CG-32)
Fiscal Year 198?
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS UAV
OCT DEPL DEPL DEPL N/A*
NOV DEPL DEPL DEPL N/A*
DEC U/W UPKP UPKP 4
JAN UPKP MAINT MAINT
FEB MAINT MAINT U/W 6
MAR TRNG TRNG INSP 9
APR MAINT MAINT U/W 5
MAY UPKP MAINT MAINT 2
JUN MAINT MAINT MAINT
JUL UPKP UPKP UPKP
AUG UPKP UPKP UPKP 7
SEP U/W U/W UPKP 14
•info unavailable, ship assigned to CINCLANTFLT
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS UAV
OCT MAINT TRNG U/W 14
NOV INSP MAINT TRNG 12
DEC U/W U/W UPKP 11
JAN MAINT UPKP UPKP 4
FEB UPKP U/W UPKP 7
MAR MAINT INSP UPKP 2
APR EXER EXER EXER 18
MAY UPKP UPKP TRNG 4
JUN EXER EXER U/W 23
JUL UPKP UPKP U/W 6
AUG UPKP MAINT UPKP 4
SEP U/W DEPL DEPL 10






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT TRNG TRNG UPKP 19
NOV U/W EXER EXER 19
DEC U/W UPKP UPKP 9
JAN DEPL DEPL DEPL 4
FEB DEPL DEPL DEPL 18
MAR DEPL DEPL DEPL 22
APR UPKP UPKP EXER 10
MAY UPKP UPKP INSP 2
JUN DEPL DEPL DEPL 20
JUL DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 27
SEP DEPL U/W MAINT 10
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT MAINT MAINT MAINT
NOV MAINT MAINT MAINT
DEC MAINT MAINT MAINT
JAN MAINT MAINT U/W 11
FEB U/W TRNG U/W 17
MAR DEPL DEPL DEPL 19
APR DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
MAY U/W UPKP UPKP 6
JUN TRNG U/W U/W 15
JUL MAINT MAINT MAINT
AUG MAINT U/W TRNG 9
SEP INSP INSP MAINT 10






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT UPKP UPKP EXER 9
NOV EXER DEPL DEPL 24
DEC DEPL DEPL UPKP 12
JAN UPKP U/W UPKP 15
FEB EXER UPKP MAINT 7
MAR MAINT INSP U/W 9
APR TRNG U/W MAINT 8
MAY MAINT EXER EXER 18
JUN EXER U/W TRNG 15
JUL MAINT U/W UPKP 3
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 21
SEP DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT DEPL DEPL DEPL 31
NOV DEPL DEPL DEPL 25
DEC DEPL U/W UPKP 10
JAN MAINT INSP MAINT
FEB EXER EXER UPKP 11
MAR INSP UPKP UPKP 1
APR INSP DEPL DEPL 12
MAY DEPL UPKP EXER 14
JUN MAINT U/W U/W 13
JUL UPKP U/W U/W 14
AUG U/W UPKP U/W 11
SEP TRNG TRNG UPKP 2




USS COOK (FF- 1083)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT U/W U/W MAINT 16
NOV TRNG UPKP UPKP 7
DEC MAINT INSP UPKP 2
JAN UPKP MAINT U/W 9
FEB U/W UPKP TRNG 9
MAR U/W U/W INSP 16
APR TRNG EXER UPKP 15
MAY UPKP INSP EXER 13
JUN EXER UPKP UPKP 6
JUL UPKP UPKP DEPL 8
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 26
SEP DEPL DEPL DEPL 29
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT DEPL DEPL DEPL 31
NOV DEPL DEPL DEPL 25
DEC DEPL DEPL DEPL 18
JAN MAINT MAINT U/W 7
FEB UPKP UPKP TRNG 1
MAR UPKP U/W UPKP 13
APR UPKP UPKP UPKP 5
MAY MAINT MAINT MAINT 2
JUN MAINT MAINT MAINT
JUL MAINT MAINT MAINT 1
AUG MAINT MAINT MAINT
SEP MAINT U/W U/W 9






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT MAINT MAINT EXER 11
NOV EXER EXER EXER 25
DEC DEPL DEPL DEPL 13
JAN DEPL DEPL DEPL 29
FEB DEPL DEPL DEPL 20
MAR DEPL DEPL DEPL 29
APR DEPL DEPL DEPL 23
MAY DEPL DEPL DEPL 21
JUN UPKP UPKP MAINT
JUL MAINT TRNG TRNG 10
AUG UPKP U/W MAINT 7
SEP MAINT MAINT MAINT
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT MAINT MAINT INSP 7
NOV TRNG UPKP TRNG 10
DEC INSP INSP UPKP 8
JAN UPKP UPKP U/W 14
FEB MAINT MAINT MAINT
MAR U/W MAINT MAINT 4
APR u/w U/W UPKP 21
MAY UPKP UPKP U/W 12
JUN U/W TRNG INSP 10
JUL MAINT UPKP TRNG 9
AUG UPKP MAINT MAINT 3
SEP UPKP EXER EXER 20




USS FANNING (FF- 1076)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT EXER EXER EXER 25
NOV EXER UPKP UPKP 9
DEC UPKP EXER UPKP 7
JAN UPKP UPKP EXER 11
FEB UPKP UPKP DEPL 8
MAR DEPL DEPL DEPL 22
APR DEPL DEPL DEPL 14
MAY DEPL DEPL DEPL 22
JUN DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
JUL DEPL DEPL DEPL 24
AUG DEPL DEPL UPKP 29
SEP UPKP UPKP U/W 7
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT U/W U/W U/W 25
NOV UPKP UPKP MAINT 1
DEC MAINT MAINT MAINT
JAN MAINT MAINT MAINT
FEB MAINT UPKP UPKP 7
MAR UPKP U/W UPKP 10
APR U/W INSP UPKP 12
MAY UPKP UPKP EXER 11
JUN EXER U/W INSP 10
JUL MAINT TRNG INSP 10
AUG MAINT TRNG MAINT
SEP UPKP EXER EXER 18




USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF-1067)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT OVHL OVHL OVHL
NOV OVHL OVHL OVHL
DEC OVHL OVHL OVHL
JAN OVHL OVHL OVHL
FEB OVHL OVHL OVHL
MAR OVHL OVHL OVHL
APR OVHL OVHL OVHL
MAY OVHL OVHL OVHL 6
JUN OVHL OVHL OVHL 3
JUL U/W U/W U/W 24
AUG U/W U/W UPKP 13
SEP TRNG TRNG UPKP 9
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT U/W TRNG INSP 16
NOV TRNG TRNG UPKP 17
DEC INSP U/W UPKP 7
JAN UPKP INPS DEPL 13
FEB DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
MAR DEPL DEPL DEPL 26
APR U/W UPKP UPKP 10
MAY UPKP UPKP UPKP 3
JUN U/W U/W U/W 27
JUL UPKP UPKP U/W 8
AUG UPKP U/W EXER 17
SEP U/W UPKP UPKP 6






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT MAINT INSP U/W 8
NOV U/W U/W EXER 24
DEC U/W UPKP UPKP 7
JAN MAINT TRNG TRNG 7
FEB U/W U/W U/W 23
MAR UPKP U/W UPKP 21
APR INSP U/W UPKP 16
MAY UPKP U/W U/W 15
JUN UPKP U/W UPKP 18
JUL DEPL DEPL DEPL 31
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 25
SEP DEPL DEPL DEPL 20
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT UPKP U/W UPKP 17
NOV TRNG INSP U/W 16
DEC U/W INSP UPKP 11
JAN U/W U/W U/W 25
FEB MAINT MAINT MAINT 1
MAR MAINT MAINT MAINT
APR MAINT MAINT UPKP 4
MAY UPKP TRNG TRNG 16
JUN U/W EXER UPKP 15
JUL TRNG EXER EXER 21
AUG U/W TRNG U/W 20
SEP UPKP UPKP TRNG 7






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT INSP UPKP U/W 15
NOV UPKP U/W U/W 23
DEC U/W UPKP MAINT 7
JAN MAINT MAINT MAINT
FEB MAINT MAINT MAINT
MAR MAINT INSP U/W 9
APR UPKP INSP UPKP 6
MAY UPKP U/W U/W 16
JUN UPKP U/W UPKP 18
JUL DEPL DEPL DEPL 30
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 29
SEP DEPL DEPL DEPL 24
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT UPKP U/W UPKP 9
NOV INSP U/W INSP 16
DEC U/W UPKP UPKP 11
JAN UPKP U/W UPKP 5
FEB U/W U/W UPKP 21
MAR U/W U/W U/W 23
APR TRNG UPKP U/W 5
MAY TRNG U/W UPKP 9
JUN U/W INSP U/W 16
JUL U/W UPKP UPKP 11
AUG UPKP UPKP EXER 11
SEP U/W U/W UPKP 7






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT UPKP U/W UPKP 11
NOV U/W U/W EXER 26
DEC u/w UPKP UPKP 6
JAN UPKP UPKP UPKP 5
FEB U/W U/W UPKP 19
MAR U/W U/W UPKP 20
APR u/w UPKP UPKP 4
MAY TRNG U/W OVHL 10
JUN OVHL OVHL OVHL
JUL OVHL OVHL OVHL





Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT OVHL OVHL OVHL
NOV OVHL OVHL OVHL 3
DEC OVHL OVHL OVHL 2
JAN OVHL OVHL OVHL
FEB UPKP U/W TRNG 6
MAR U/W EXER UPKP 19
APR UPKP TRNG TRNG 19
MAY TRNG UPKP TRNG 16
JUN UPKP UPKP INSP 13
JUL TRNG UPKP U/W 11
AUG UPKP UPKP TRNG 11
SEP TRNG U/W UPKP 9




USS STEIN (FF- 1075)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT UPKP MAINT MAINT 8
NOV MAINT MAINT INSP 8
DEC UPKP UPKP UPKP 1
JAN UPKP MAINT MAINT
FEB UPKP UPKP U/W 8
MAR U/W UPKP INSP 13
APR MAINT INSP MAINT 6
MAY MAINT MAINT MAINT
JUN MAINT MAINT MAINT
JUL MAINT MAINT TRNG 6
AUG U/W U/W U/W 19
SEP U/W EXER U/W 22
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT U/W MAINT U/W 8
NOV TRNG INSP INSP 13
DEC TRNG TRNG UPKP
JAN UPKP UPKP EXER 11
FEB UPKP TRNG EXER 10
MAR EXER UPKP UPKP 9
APR UPKP MAINT MAINT
MAY MAINT MAINT MAINT
JUN UPKP TRNG U/W 7
JUL UPKP UPKP TRNG 8
AUG UPKP UPKP TRNG 6
SEP INSP UPKP EXER 17






Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT OVHL OVHL OVHL
NOV OVHL OVHL OVHL
DEC OVHL OVHL OVHL
JAN OVHL OVHL OVHL
FEB OVHL OVHL OVHL
MAR OVHL OVHL OVHL 2
APR OVHL TRNG TRNG 1
MAY UPKP U/W UPKP 15
JUN UPKP U/W U/W 14
JUL TRNG U/W U/W 21
AUG UPKP U/W INSP 10
SEP UPKP UPKP EXER 5
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 DAYS U/W
OCT UPKP INSP INSP 1
NOV UPKP U/W UPKP 9
DEC INSP UPKP UPKP
JAN U/W UPKP EXER 11
FEB UPKP EXER UPKP 6
MAR UPKP UPKP DEPL 9
APR DEPL DEPL DEPL 19
MAY DEPL DEPL DEPL 26
JUN DEPL DEPL DEPL 26
JUL DEPL DEPL DEPL 25
AUG DEPL DEPL DEPL 18
SEP UPKP UPKP UPKP
Last regular overhaul completed: April 1985
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Appendix: B
MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS FOX (CG-33)
Fiscal Year 1985 •
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 34211 146562 61431 242205
NOV 131678 34702 58024 224405
DEC 32530 76902 74107 183540
JAN 251509 68245 116743 436498
FEB 66380 180657 80033 327070
MAR 42838 (37593) 176689 181934
APR 86687 93210 60213 240110
MAY 95069 142960 76156 314186
JUN 135330 75399 53378 264048
JUL 105009 147139 58120 310268
AUG 2767 40767 184491 228026
SEP (19767) 80867 100682 161782
FY 85 Total $ 3114072
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 94969 38030 57657 190637
NOV 53947 89520 104253 247721
DEC 73384 20820 36603 130808
JAN 59435 152972 14881 227290
FEB 77545 31237 47028 155811
MAR 20443 39237 (29761) 29918
APR 31941 31557 23187 86687
MAY 46740 (7662) 121588 160666
JUN 75504 87685 41627 204818
JUL 38654 89435 3100 131191
AUG 10561 52066 44507 107134






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS HORNE (CG-30)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT $122063 90161 168927 381151
NOV 128411 27755 47892 204058
DEC 56440 70177 72389 199008
JAN 126411 188278 130831 445522
FEB 72428 38967 41371 152768
MAR 49166 51709 105652 206498
APR 344060 145278 83990 573328
MAY 128524 153457 (1044) 280837
JUN 167443 198747 93377 459568
JUL (11211) 164665 (50687) 102766
AUG 243575 146176 54562 444314
SEP 65725 88551 180131 334408
FY 85 Total $3784226
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 95561 116966 82512 295040
NOV 79370 35939 56310 171621
DEC 73171 37084 (4100) 106155
JAN 78044 48558 75259 201862
FEB 64644 104553 4505 173703
MAR 62787 101458 46260 210506
APR 54021 60857 58265 173144
MAY 49278 29343 48002 126624
JUN 42885 115247 24071 182204
JUL 45907 11888 248922 306717
AUG 24692 47604 79107 151403






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS JOUETT (CG-29)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 127200 371985 136023 635209
NOV 91481 31113 83371 205966
DEC 122674 17508 859 141042
JAN 37254 84100 69773 188985
FEB 62756 41832 39377 143966
MAR 47733 35329 14454 97517
APR 93732 45106 81517 220356
MAY 66227 46235 84542 197006
JUN 71628 33415 22713 127758
JUL 70959 73794 102948 247702
AUG 40386 97120 192544 330051
SEP 57105 83495 16886 157487
FY 85 Total $ 2693045
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 167569 44423 82082 294075
NOV 81261 43656 51777 176694
DEC 59557 37531 777 97867
JAN 72525 116265 99843 288634
FEB 103508 59547 88517 251574
MAR 25364 110772 17438 153575
APR 195343 83353 102261 380958
MAY 111566 41324 33578 186469
JUN 109705 77268 41147 228121
JUL 82631 73746 107539 236916
AUG 112619 38517 74209 225346






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS WILLIAM H. STANDLEY (CG-32)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 134998 94473 70418 299890
NOV 44191 58752 85477 188421
DEC 32795 26225 13099 72121
JAN 75927 25217 57260 158405
FEB 98445 39916 68958 207321
MAR 86946 128115 20069 235131
APR 167760 18540 30130 216430
MAY 63263 65308 59168 187740
JUN 52967 81309 21110 155388
JUL 56855 93915 151506 302277
AUG 220414 20206 330473 571094
SEP 100470 37663 55174 193308
FY 85 Total $ 2787526
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 103393 156732 114646 374772
NOV 98839 39073 69133 207046
DEC 22794 63733 31294 117822
JAN 3171 12251 87575 102999
FEB 85108 69128 134977 289214
MAR 122980 70124 43332 236437
APR 200624 68990 49306 318921
MAY 69241 29786 118743 217771
JUN 43522 36556 45611 125691
JUL 90180 67165 98443 255790
AUG 62617 36427 76590 175635






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USSSTERETT (CG-31)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 175994 64617 91286 331897
NOV 70611 126269 48153 245033
DEC 105722 60245 31644 197611
JAN 38591 45077 211190 294858
FEB 107802 87080 92811 287693
MAR 65797 133461 103446 302705
APR 63345 122721 15689 201757
MAY 77312 36639 212091 326043
JUN 149747 119244 10389 279381
JUL 55076 111545 117981 284603
AUG 107814 56770 135041 299627
SEP 60479 16573 68740 145792
FY 85 Total $ 3 1 97000
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 108268 12592 142628 263489
NOV 16763 78385 92491 187641
DEC 134174 79900 377966 592041
JAN 157172 137512 197210 491895
FEB 68508 111235 17155 196899
MAR 67498 99711 66843 234053
APR 139966 43847 29115 212930
MAY 19789 67860 61085 148735
JUN 141109 127932 74994 344036
JUL 32928 8002 87781 62855
AUG 26180 100162 62977 194320






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS BADGER (FF- 1071)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 53055 50613 43871 147540
NOV 30743 27897 31524 90165
DEC 20705 14873 168 35747
JAN 27005 79496 25272 131776
FEB 41291 20940 26677 88909
MAR 33279 39423 27857 100560
APR 49606 59966 43262 152835
MAY 31300 20104 26585 77989
JUN 90298 21913 8710 120923
JUL 54962 43984 3200 102147
AUG 21747 62463 13581 97792
SEP 12894 10941 13531 37366
FY 85 Total $ 1 183749
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 57803 32381 24345 114530
NOV 45953 21703 6990 74647
DEC 20172 4762 6582 31516
JAN 21132 21631 59534 102298
FEB 66391 46298 4467 117157
MAR 41764 17358 31524 90647
APR 36681 16410 7922 61014
MAY 41513 30658 19621 91792
JUN 35495 38826 20844 95166
JUL 19513 6705 41995 68214
AUG 46144 2196 48723 97064






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS COOK (FF- 1083)
Fiscal Yeai• 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 20472 26979 20702 68153
NOV 49828 8392 21597 79818
DEC 34535 29822 7431 71790
JAN 32522 39802 30126 102451
FEB 18420 4824 15559 38805
MAR 26426 15457 23002 64886
APR 67296 73913 9761 150971
MAY 70326 60728 16520 147575
JUN 22394 22567 58303 103265
JUL 25037 51339 16700 93077
AUG 111988 33557 31506 177052





Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 14283 29490 14239 57932
NOV 42678 47901 20188 110768
DEC 23457 3497 733 27688
JAN 23796 15028 19118 57944
FEB 16020 27581 22073 65675
MAR 14715 40719 2558 57992
APR 44319 34980 9984 89284
MAY 22403 5618 6072 34093
JUN 22403 5618 6072 34093
JUL 12029 19532 21903 53465
AUG 31821 59205 62733 153760






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS DOWNES (FF-1070)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 99193 31479 75028 205700
NOV 5026 39728 29215 73969
DEC 39463 20179 73143 132786
JAN 27118 36085 54807 118011
FEB 73313 21601 2677 97592
MAR 25704 (1620) 44809 68892
APR 88121 15320 15497 118939
MAY 11619 30869 (17016) 25472
JUN 21508 31440 8629 61578
JUL 60234 60609 16312 137155
AUG 1402 12086 20090 33579
SEP 15284 62689 25665 103638
FY 85 Total $ 1177311
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 24965 28154 45405 98524
NOV 51548 30642 9085 91276
DEC 40022 25940 33886 99849
JAN 37166 45833 56153 139153
FEB 3361 40459 12744 56564
MAR 5813 9598 5098 20509
APR 53684 64151 14969 132806
MAY 39293 14270 122 53686
JUN (18523) 25143 (180495) (173875)
JUL 64929 99635 184 164748
AUG 32003 17583 39642 89229






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS FANNING (FF- 1076)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 20152 30120 39318 89590
NOV 30552 50577 29134 110264
DEC 23273 33231 17547 74052
JAN 32519 19623 107337 159479
FEB 85182 26562 17510 129255
MAR 44736 10449 20534 75720
APR 25719 75867 38786 140373
MAY 18030 19879 28706 66616
JUN 16334 39321 16974 72629
JUL 62717 38404 24138 125259
AUG 20687 9752 7945 38385
SEP 2523 39765 1564 43852
FY 85 Total $ 1125474
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 37838 56243 27451 121532
NOV 18274 36847 17722 72843
DEC 20148 12397 5252 37799
JAN 27937 25674 36063 89676
FEB 35717 23437 34640 93796
MAR 28062 10397 9324 47784
APR 84431 40095 27192 151718
MAY 48180 17883 17018 83082
JUN 25093 14862 8906 48862
JUL 34169 33484 2081 69735
AUG 33349 7347 38277 78974






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF- 1067)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 16686 51319 90788 158795
NOV 21588 14728 7493 43810
DEC 54756 5062 10362 70180
JAN 17833 12150 19858 49842
FEB 19940 10087 28352 58380
MAR 564 122593 14645 137803
APR 18123 26777 17121 62022
MAY 37497 19482 4624 61604
JUN 43151 13767 13749 70668
JUL 27310 34385 33099 94794
AUG 55733 27558 67495 150787
SEP 73955 53415 105290 232661
FY 85 Total $ 1191346
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 12905 18056 45065 76027
NOV 29305 11702 5345 46354
DEC 9837 8149 12655 30642
JAN 27021 88146 29335 144502
FEB 26686 17231 18956 62873
MAR 54522 21564 20503 96589
APR 25576 20073 8328 53977
MAY 12976 5291 65034 83303
JUN (23146) 33796 22180 32830
JUL 39834 10441 70691 120967
AUG 15153 29060 24176 68390






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS KIRK (FF-1087)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 7918 24806 15132 47856
NOV 25618 13520 13711 52851
DEC 27907 76567 8912 113386
JAN 30721 40168 21581 92471
FEB 22448 31448 22973 76871
MAR 6311 28951 37704 72967
APR 46253 28223 15119 89596
MAY 33430 15611 22188 71230
JUN 21210 51744 13957 86912
JUL 16714 30491 37004 84210
AUG 41366 65175 40960 147502
SEP 115542 20280 10802 146626
FY 85 Total $ 1082478
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 20451 23412 21551 65414
NOV 27655 35053 31303 94012
DEC 181044 (150091) 80182 111135
JAN 144939 32492 24619 202051
FEB 23262 19054 42361 84677
MAR 17331 33020 1702 52054
APR 6225 37904 19489 63620
MAY 9864 8031 32513 50409
JUN 29600 54348 8159 92107
JUL 26107 24966 22669 73743
AUG 61623 (18786) 4277 47114






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS KNOX (FF- 1052)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 23682 36625 31978 92286
NOV 57458 22741 18084 98284
DEC 25323 6913 8162 40399
JAN 18738 19925 55150 93814
FEB 32955 51266 30333 114555
MAR 16754 65712 11791 94258
APR 30860 155765 34279 220905
MAY 32894 45101 33214 111210
JUN 9727 26111 (37941) (2102)
JUL 44339 34790 40565 119695
AUG 98204 42177 55165 195546





Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 95761 19987 25162 140911
NOV 77311 23668 33375 134356
DEC 38324 13285 10177 61787
JAN 14938 15169 46325 76433
FEB 20404 30274 9217 59895
MAR 65733 40040 28460 134234
APR 30054 22082 28658 80794
MAY 30351 10876 17021 58249
JUN 27792 (18228) 23773 33517
JUL 39412 40095 30963 110471
AUG 24917 82840 28909 136667






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS LOCKWOOD(FF-1064)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 39193 44713 29598 113505
NOV 19800 28567 35868 84235
DEC 39226 24033 8073 71332
JAN 28381 43034 80488 151904
FEB (1903) 54806 140020 192923
MAR 7824 38092 9344 55262
APR 99425 8007 45143 152567
MAY 31822 31864 8906 72593
JUN 13655 29066 5342 48064
JUL 42517 15690 140 58348
AUG 40585 21360 27615 89561





Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 39667 128747 33442 201857
NOV 16416 23914 12602 52934
DEC 5169 23686 586 29442
JAN 11143 15809 18358 45312
FEB 22714 25127 13634 61467
MAR 50882 23052 2733 76666
APR 16470 25592 33414 75477
MAY 12128 41165 16039 69333
JUN 11697 19841 9436 40975
JUL 41040 11649 8904 61594
AUG 27233 36592 4179 68005






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS STEIN (FF- 1065)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 47183 47797 26080 121058
NOV 50619 28792 26201 105614
DEC 13501 8817 654 22974
JAN 64232 16673 69963 150870
FEB 15451 56485 15431 87368
MAR 64058 36856 16864 117779
APR 66037 29907 4967 100912
MAY 20070 34422 26927 81419
JUN 39479 5610 21556 66646
JUL 36506 94943 5788 137238
AUG 23310 (8272) 41463 56501
SEP 49550 66893 47713 164158
FY 85 Total $ 1212537
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 50200 15759 70771 136732
NOV 28819 17387 13358 59565
DEC 23647 22807 5528 51984
JAN 16129 21617 37509 75255
FEB 60171 75673 9078 144923
MAR (8917) 9173 25135 25392
APR 10472 14462 35869 60804
MAY 28273 24439 37953 90666
JUN 13856 12729 15560 42147
JUL 34567 21608 48556 304741
AUG 46683 18141 51482 116307






MONTHLY OPTAR OBLIGATION DATA
USS WHIPPLE (FF- 1062)
Fiscal Year 1985
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 156803 23561 17925 198288
NOV 28172 5230 12460 45864
DEC 8931 360102 11234 380269
JAN 18018 28804 37847 84670
FEB 26193 26571 14494 67258
MAR 13504 27066 20416 60986
APR 22355 54556 15498 92409
MAY 38184 7097 22258 67539
JUN 53473 8251 22596 84321
JUL 11176 21916 41303 74396
AUG 40979 17162 44198 102340
SEP 14813 15977 27234 58025
FY 85 Total $ 1316365
Fiscal Year 1986
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
OCT 23738 54829 64401 142969
NOV 43696 21277 13029 78003
DEC 18503 3976 23386 45857
JAN 43098 25832 87299 156230
FEB 39888 27747 33126 100764
MAR 4959 2806 24320 32085
APR 34087 41840 17891 93818
MAY 43812 28853 17157 89823
JUN 25144 25144 25144 75433
JUL 52081 15966 32961 101008
AUG 23154 41037 11177 75369
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